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Abstract 
In 2013, the South African delegation to the African Union (AU) vigorously lobbied 
other AU Member States to urgently establish the African Capacity for Immediate 
Response to Conflict (ACIRC) Brigade.  South Africa argued that the continent 
needed a rapid deployment force to respond quickly to conflicts.  Amongst others, 
the ACIRC will intervene in stabilisation, peace enforcement and intervention 
missions, the neutralisation of terrorist groups, and attacks on legitimate 
governments.  The decision to establish the ACIRC was a response to the M23 
occupation of Goma and French intervention to assist the Malian government, which 
was under attack from Tuareg separatists and other Islamic fundamentalist groups. 
Critics of the ACIRC mechanism argue that it goes against the principles of 
peacekeeping and is an indication that South Africa is advocating for a departure 
from pacifist to robust military intervention.  From South Africa’s perspective, the 
ACIRC Brigade is intended to fill the security gap left by the African Standby Force.  
This research study argues that the ACIRC is not an indicator that South Africa is 
advocating for a departure from pacifist to robust military intervention when 
resolving conflict in Africa.  Instead, the ACIRC mechanism, like the Force 
Intervention Brigade and the French army intervention in the Democratic Republic 
of Congo and Mali respectively, will provide the AU with a quick response 
mechanism for conflict.  The robustness of response will be determined by the threat 
at the tactical level of military operation.  As such, the deployment of the ACIRC 
Brigade will still be guided by the principles of peacekeeping as laid out in the UN 
Charter and Article 4(h) of the AU Constitutive Act. 
In this respect, post-apartheid South Africa has played a leading role in resolving 
conflicts in Africa.  Those who subscribe to realism argue that South Africa 
participates in peace missions for its own self-benefit.  They argue that its 
participation in peace missions will increase its global stature and improve its 
credibility in its quest to become a permanent member of the United Nations 
Security Council.  On the other hand, idealists argue that South Africa’s participation 
in peace missions is inspired by the principles of ubuntu and altruism.  This research 
study argues that both the realist and the idealist arguments are credible when 
assessing South Africa’s participation in peace missions in Africa.  However, 
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notwithstanding the credibility of both arguments, there is more evidence to support 
the realist view on South Africa’s participation in peace missions. 
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Chapter 1. Introduction and Background 
1.1. INTRODUCTION 
South Africa achieved inclusive democracy in 1994 after many years of struggle 
against colonialism and apartheid.  However, despite many years of the armed 
struggle against the apartheid regime, the struggle did not end through a decisive 
military victory but through a negotiated settlement.  This negotiated settlement 
culminated in an inclusive democracy with ‘relative peace’ (Barber, 2005).  
Consequently expectations were raised among the domestic and international 
community that the new democratic South Africa would transfer its conflict 
resolution skills to other parts of the world (Alden & Le Pere, 2004).  In addition, it 
was expected that South Africa would transform from being a ‘pariah state’ into a 
responsible and respected member of the global community (Schraeder, 2001).  
South Africa has indeed lived up to this expectation.  The domestic and international 
expectations, coupled with its colonial and apartheid legacies, would later become 
some of the key references that formed the basis of South Africa’s future foreign 
policy (Moore, 2014). 
As widely expected, the new exponents of foreign policy in South Africa were 
preoccupied with transforming its foreign policy from that of a ‘pariah’ state to one 
that would be globally accepted (Alden & Le Pere, 2004).  As such, the new 
democratic regime made it clear that South Africa was going to be a responsible 
global ‘citizen’.  It was then not surprising when Nelson Mandela announced that 
South Africa’s foreign policy would be anchored in the promotion of human rights 
and democracy, conflict resolution and global cooperation (Alden & Le Pere, 2004; 
Mandela, 1993).  In fact, Pretoria was prepared to meet the expectation of 
transferring its successful conflict resolution experience to the African continent. 
South Africa has the most developed and is one of the biggest economies on the 
African continent.  In addition, it has one of the most advanced military apparatus in 
Africa to back-up its upper middle income status (Global Fire Power, 2016).  As a 
result South Africa has used its middle power status and regional hegemon to play a 
key role in championing the African renaissance agenda which aimed at rebuilding 
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the continent and bringing peace and stability to the continent (Gbaya, 2015; Jumat, 
Bezuidenhout, & Neethling, 2014). 
In South Africa’s Draft White Paper on Foreign Policy, entitled Building a Better 
World: The Diplomacy of Ubuntu, (hereafter draft white paper on foreign policy) the 
government acknowledges that it is not possible for South Africa to be an “island of 
prosperity in an ocean of poverty” (DIRCO, 2011, p. 20).  The draft white paper on 
foreign policy further emphasises that South Africa’s struggle for a better life is 
inherently linked with that of the continent and hence Africa is at the centre of South 
Africa’s national interests.  In order to achieve South Africa’s ambitions of a 
prosperous and competitive African continent, it is vital that certain preconditions, 
such as security, peace and stability, are normalised.  There will not be any upward 
mobility in Africa’s development if security concerns are not addressed.  As an 
advocate for Africa’s renewal, South Africa has taken a lead in contributing towards 
security, peace and stability on the continent (Moore, 2014). 
South Africa has become one of the leading role players in issues concerning conflict 
resolution in Africa.  Its peace diplomatic efforts range from of all forms of conflict 
resolution mechanisms, including, but not limited to, mediation, negotiations, peace-
making, peacebuilding, peacekeeping, post conflict building and recovery (Van 
Nieuwkerk, 2012).  Since 1994 South Africa has participated in various conflict 
resolutions efforts such as the mediation in Nigeria, leading negotiations between 
governments and rebel groups in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and 
Burundi, bilateral missions in Burundi and the Central African Republic (CAR), UN 
peacekeeping mission in the DRC, AU led Peace Mission in Darfur, Observer 
Mission in Ethiopia/Eretria, military intervention in Lesotho (peace enforcement) 
under the banner of the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) and chief 
envoy leading to the establishment of the state of South Sudan, to mention but few 
examples where it participated in conflict resolutions (Heinecken & Ferreira, 2012; 
Neethling, 2003a) 
One of the key instruments of South Africa’s foreign policy in respect of achieving 
its conflict resolution objectives is the South African National Defence Force 
(SANDF).  The SANDF plays a key role in conflict resolution on the continent, 
particularly in peace missions.  The SANDF has been deployed in several United 
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Nations (UN), African Union (AU) and SADC peace missions since 1998 in pursuit 
of peace and stability on the continent (Neethling, 2003a).  However, for South 
Africa, despite the fact that the SANDF is deployed in some of the conflict areas, its 
preference is that conflict and disputes should be resolved peacefully through 
dialogue.  This approach is informed by the guiding principle outlined in South 
Africa’s constitution and other government policy documents (South African 
Defence Review, 2015).  The main aim of the military instrument (SANDF) is to 
assist in the monitoring and implementation of the agreements that follow upon the 
political and diplomatic process. 
Between 2000 and 2016, South Africa has participated in no fewer than 15 peace 
missions.  At the time of the study it was preparing for a peace mission force to enter 
the new hotspot in South Sudan (Conwell, 2016).  At 31 December 2016 South 
Africa was ranked as the 13th troop contributing country in Africa and 19th in the 
world (United Nations, 2017).  Even if its participation is not the biggest in terms of 
troop contribution, South Africa remains an important player.  Given its status as one 
of the key role players in African conflict resolutions, particularly peace missions as 
this is the focus of this research study, it was deemed appropriate to conduct a 
scholarly enquiry, at least from a foreign policy perspective, into how South Africa 
approaches these peace missions and what its motivations are for participating in 
such peace missions. 
Except for Lesotho in 1998, where South Africa opted to use military force to 
resolve conflict and restore peace, South Africa has tended to steer away from using 
robust military intervention in conflict resolutions.  However, most recently, starting 
from 2012, South Africa has demonstrated that, when necessary, it is prepared to 
resort to robust military intervention. This was in fact demonstrated by its 
participation in the Force Intervention Brigade (FIB) in the eastern DRC 
(McKaughan, 2015).  Furthermore, South Africa was also at the forefront of the 
establishment of the interim continental rapid intervention force known as the 
African Capacity for Immediate Response to Crises (ACIRC) (Brosig & Sempijja, 
2015; Warner, 2015).  Although South Africa’s participation in the FIB and ACIRC 
is through multilateral forums such as the AU and the UN, it is worth noting that, in 
most cases, it is at the forefront of championing these initiatives and that it 
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volunteers first in respect of providing resources and personnel (Nathan & others, 
2013). 
It is thus clear that South Africa has dedicated itself to playing a significant role in 
the achievement of peace and stability on the African continent.  However, the 
question then arises as to why it is prepared to dedicate itself to play such a 
significant role across of its boarders despite the numerous challenges such as 
poverty, unemployment and inequality on the domestic front.  From the realist 
perspective, one may argue that South Africa would not use its limited resources 
beyond its borders if it had nothing to gain and, hence, the country must be 
benefiting in some way from its participation in peace missions.  On the other hand, 
idealists would argue that South Africa does not have to benefit per se, but that it 
may be unselfishly participating in peace missions for altruistic reasons in alignment 
with the ‘ubuntu’ principles as expressed on its draft white paper on foreign policy 
(Van Nieuwkerk, 2012). 
This research paper has two main objectives.  Firstly, the paper aims to determine 
whether there has been a shift from the traditional pacifist approach to peace 
missions to a more robust military approach.  This question has arisen from South 
Africa’s participation in the FIB and its stance on the establishment of ACIRC.  
Secondly, the paper aims to establish South Africa’s motives for participating in 
peace missions.  In other words, from the International Relations (IR) theory point of 
view, is South Africa’s participation in peace missions driven by realism or 
idealism?  In an attempt to realise these research objectives, this exploratory study 
analysed South Africa’s participation in peace missions, particularly its role in the 
FIB and ACIRC. 
1.2. RESEARCH PROBLEM 
Since 2003, South Africa has been at the forefront of ensuring that the African 
Standby Force (ASF), as part of the African Peace and Security Architecture 
(APSA), comes to fruition.  The ASF was envisaged to be fully operational by 2010 
but, thus far, this has not happened (Warner, 2015).  The delay in establishing the 
ASF has had a detrimental effect on the AU’s aspiration of taking ownership in 
addressing armed conflicts on the continent.  In fact, the continued delay in the 
establishment of the ASF has left those countries with weaker security apparatus 
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vulnerable to a resurgence of internal conflicts, insurgency and other forms of 
insecurities (Warner, 2015). 
For example, during 2012, the March 23 Movement (M23) launched a military 
offensive and occupied Goma, the capital of north Kivu province in the eastern 
DRC.  The M23 was met with little resistance from that country’s armed forces.  To 
make matters worse, when Goma fell to the M23, there was an estimated 17 000 
strong United Nations Organisation Stabilisation Mission (MONUSCO) in the 
country but the mission did nothing to halt M23 advances (Roux, 2013).  At about 
the same time in 2012, the Tuareg separatists, known as the National Movement for 
the Liberation of Azawad (French Acronym MNLA), caused mayhem in northern 
Mali. This culminated to the destruction of various cities and towns, including Gao 
and Timbuktu, which threatened fall of the government in Bamako and with little 
resistance from the Malian army (Lounnas, 2013).  To the embarrassment of the AU, 
the Malian government was forced to request assistance from its former colonial 
master, France, to halt the MNLA and the advances of other rebel Islamic 
movements to the south.  This was after both ECOWAS and the AU had failed to 
raise a force in defence of the Malian government (Arieff, 2013). 
These two incidents played a significant role in convincing some of the AU member 
states, notably South Africa, that, if the continent is to realise its dream of ‘African 
Solutions to African problems’ in respect of peace and stability, the moment was ripe 
to take matters into their own hands (Nathan & others, 2013).  In other words, these 
two events presented a ‘now or never’ opportunity to realise the ideals of ‘African 
solution to African problems’, as envisaged by the AU and South Africa’s African 
Agenda (Møller, 2009). 
In response to the fall of Goma during 2012 to the M23, South Africa played a key 
role in mobilising SADC member states to establish a Neutral Intervention Force 
(NIF) in the eastern DRC (Cammaert, 2013) .  The SADC NIF was later adopted by 
the UN after the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) had unanimously passed 
Resolution 2098 to respond militarily to the crisis in the eastern DRC (Karlsrud, 
2015; Sheeran & Case, 2014).  This intervention force was named the UN FIB and 
consisted mainly of troops from South Africa, Malawi and Tanzania (Mutton, 2013).  
The UNSC Resolution 2098 authorised the FIB to use all means necessary to 
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neutralise and disarm rebels operating in the eastern DRC (Janik, 2014).  The FIB 
added a new dimension to UN peacekeeping as, for the “first time in its history, the 
UN had authorised an offensive combat force intended to neutralise and disarm an 
armed rebel group” (Cammaert, 2013, p. 2). 
Apart from Operation Boleas in 1998, this was the first-time South Africa had 
participated in a peace mission involving offensive military combat on foreign soil.  
Furthermore, South Africa was one of the countries which had loudly campaigned 
for the urgent establishment of ACIRC (Warner, 2015).  One may be justified to 
interpreting South Africa’s role in the both FIB and ACIRC as a change in approach 
or, at least, a realisation of the need to change its approach from the traditional 
pacifist approach to a more robust military intervention in the quest to bring about 
stability and the protection of civilians.  In fact, the military interventions by the FIB 
in the eastern DRC and the French armed forces in Mali succeeded in stopping the 
armed charge by the insurgents and forced them back to the negotiating table (Boeke 
& Schuurman, 2015; Cammaert, 2013).  One may also be justified in assuming that 
the aforementioned interventions have saved innocent lives in line with the UN 
Responsibility to Protect (R2P) principles (MacFarlane, Thielking, & Weiss, 2004). 
Taking into consideration the occupation of Goma, the capture of northern cities in 
Mali during 2012 and the continued instability in South Sudan, CAR, Darfur, 
Somalia, and Burundi, to mention just a few examples, it may perhaps be advisable 
for South Africa and the AU to reconsider their approach to conflict resolutions and 
to change from the pacifist to the robust military approach to prevent violent armed 
hostilities and loss of innocent civilian lives. 
South Africa is a significant role player in conflict resolutions on the continent and, 
therefore, it is important to understand its preferred approach to peace missions 
because the country has the potential to influence the AU’s policy approach to 
conflict resolution (Neethling, 2015).  In addition, it is equally important to 
understand its motivations in order to understand why South Africa chose to 
participate in some peace missions and why it did not prioritise others. 
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1.3. RESEARCH PURPOSE 
South Africa’s role and participation in peace missions has been widely studied.  
However, the issue of whether South Africa is considering a departure from pacifist 
to robust military intervention in its approach to peace missions has not yet been 
explored.  The purpose of this research study is therefore twofold: 
• Firstly, the purpose of the research study was to ascertain where there 
has been a departure from a pacifist to a robust military approach 
when South Africa has participated in/conducted peace missions on 
the continent.  This question stemmed from South Africa’s role in the 
establishment of ACIRC and its participation in the FIB. 
• Secondly, the purpose of the study was to critically analyse South 
Africa’s motivation behind its participation in peace missions.  In 
other words, at least from a foreign policy perspective, the research 
study examined whether South Africa’s participation in peace 
missions is guided by a realist or idealist understanding of IR. 
It was hoped that the study would be able to paint a comprehensive picture of an 
aspect of South Africa’s foreign policy in conflict resolutions, thus contributing to 
the academic debates on and understanding of South Africa’s foreign policy on the 
African continent, particularly in relation to peace missions. 
1.4. RESEARCH QUESTION 
If Operation Boleas is deemed to be a peace mission conducted under Chapter VIII 
of the UN Charter, then South Africa may be said to have participated in various 
peace missions since 1998 (Monyae, 2014).  At any given time before the recent 
withdrawal of the peacekeeping force from Sudan (Darfur) during April 2015, South 
Africa was contributing an average of    3 000 uniformed personnel to peace 
missions annually between 2003 and 2015 (Liebenberg & Mokoena, 2014; United 
Nations, 2017).  At the time of writing this report, South Africa had deployed over 
1,433 troops to the FBI alone and had deployed one of its top generals of the post-
apartheid era, Lieutenant General Lawrence Mgwebi, to head MONUSCO in the 
DRC (United Nations, 2016; Conwell, 2016). 
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Those who subscribe to the realist school of thought would argue that, among other 
reasons, South Africa’s participation in peace missions is motivated by the 
opportunities offered to grow its international stature, economic opportunities and 
global influence (Van Nieuwkerk, 2012).  Idealists, on the other hand, would argue 
that South Africa’s participation is rooted in its firm believe in the guiding principles 
of ‘ubuntu’ and altruism (DIRCO, 2011).  For idealists, South Africa has a moral 
obligation to participate in peace missions due to its economic and military might 
and may not stand aside while its neighbours are plunged into security instability 
(Nathan, 2011). 
Based on the observations above, there are two overarching questions that formed 
the basis of this research study.  Firstly, has there been a shift from a pacifist to a 
more robust approach to peace missions?  Secondly, what is the motivation behind 
South Africa’s participation in peace missions? 
In order to answer the overarching questions, the research paper focused on 
answering the following supplementary question: 
• Firstly, in relation to the first overarching question, namely, “Has 
there been a shift from pacifist to a more robust approach when 
conducting peace missions?”, the following sub questions were 
formulated  
• Is South Africa considering military intervention as the most 
effective form of conflict resolution? Stated differently, is there 
a likelihood that robust military intervention will feature more 
prominently in future peace missions than it does at present? 
• Does South Africa’s participation in FIB and its envisaged 
ACIRC represent merely a response to the military situation on 
the ground as they present themselves? 
• Secondly, from the IR theory perspective, what is the motivation or 
rationale behind South Africa’s participation in peace missions in 
Africa: 
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• Is South Africa’s participation influenced by a realist 
understanding of international relations? 
• Is South Africa’s participation influenced by idealism in relation 
to its international relations? 
1.5. CONCLUSION 
Foreign policy normally emanates from domestic realities.  During the first 
administration of the post-apartheid era, South Africa focused primarily on nation 
building and reconciliation.  These domestic realities for South Africa were also 
reflected on its foreign policy which placed the promotion of democracy, human 
rights and conflict resolution at the top of its agenda (G. Evans, 1999) .  From 
Nelson Mandela’s administration in 1994 to that of Jacob Zuma at the time of this 
study, South Africa has played and continues to play a key role in conflict 
resolutions in Africa.  South Africa has embraced its international obligation of 
contributing to peace and stability on the African continent (Jumat et al., 2014).  
Pretoria has always argued that peaceful resolutions to conflict will result in long 
term stability as opposed to the resolution of conflict using force and it has taken 
pride in its being an example of the peaceful resolution of conflict. 
The SANDF has been deployed in various peace missions, mainly as a ‘pacifist’ 
peacekeeping force with the main task of providing protection to civilians, protection 
services to political figures involved in negotiations and the monitoring and support 
of elections.  However, in 2008, the SANDF was deployed in a peace enforcement 
mission in Lesotho (Mmutle, 2007).  Since 2013 the SANDF has been deployed at 
the FIB in eastern DRC on another peace enforcement mission with a Chapter VII 
mandate (Nathan & others, 2013).  Clearly, the ‘robust’ military approach is a 
possible option when necessary despite Pretoria’s insistence that conflicts must be 
settled through peaceful dialogue and negotiations. 
The next chapter explores existing literature on what informs foreign policy actions 
in the hope that this will lead to an understanding of South Africa’s approach to 
peace missions and what motivates its participation in such peace missions.  The 
chapter also clarifies the conceptual framework used in the study and explains some 
of the important concepts used. 
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Chapter 2. Literature Review 
2.1. INTRODUCTION 
South Africa is arguably one of the most respected countries in matters of 
international relations in Africa.  The country has succeeded in transforming itself 
from a ‘pariah state’ to one that contributes meaningfully towards peace and stability 
on the African continent (Schraeder, 2001).  Its ‘miraculous’ achievement of an 
inclusive democracy through a negotiated settlement has persuaded many interested 
observers to admire and envy the way in which the country conducts its affairs.  
Thus, the international community waited in anticipation to see whether its peaceful 
transition from the apartheid regime to a multiparty democracy would also 
characterise its conduct of international relations (Nathan, 2011). 
With Nelson Mandela South Africa was blessed with a ‘messiah’ who preached 
peace and reconciliation not only to the country, but also to the entire African 
continent and beyond.  The international community looked up to Mandela for moral 
and ethical leadership (Borer & Mills, 2011).  His successor, Thabo Mbeki, was an 
intellectual giant who assisted in crafting strategies for Africa’s rebirth through his 
New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) initiatives and the transition 
from Organisation of African Unity (OAU) to the AU.  Mbeki hoped to provide a 
strategic vision that would emancipate the African continent from the triple 
challenges of poverty, unemployment and inequality, and bring peace and security 
on the continent (Vale & Maseko, 1998).  It was envisioned that the NEPAD 
initiatives would elevate the continent to the status of an equal partner with the other 
regions of the world and that it would no longer be perceived as a mere recipient of 
aid (Evans, 1999).  It was under Mbeki’s tenure that South Africa first deployed a 
peacekeeping force, building on Mandela’s negotiations efforts in Burundi and the 
DRC.  Since then, South Africa has continued to participate in peace missions on the 
continent (Heleta, 2016). 
Under Jacob Zuma’s administration, South Africa is continuing to make inroads in 
global politics through its participation in alliances such as BRICS (Brazil, Russia, 
India, China and South Africa).  In addition, South Africa’s Nkosazana Dlamini-
Zuma was Chair of the AU until January 2017 (Saunders, 2014).  Moreover, South 
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Africa continues to be at the forefront of Africa’s conflict resolution endeavours, 
either as facilitators for peace-making through negotiations, such as in Lesotho and 
South Sudan; peacekeeping in Sudan or peace-enforcement in the eastern DRC, to 
mention but a few (Van Nieuwkerk, 2012).  In terms of its foreign policy focus, 
South Africa remains committed to conflict resolution, peace and stability on the 
continent (DIRCO, 2011). 
South Africa’s draft white paper on foreign policy made it known that the country is 
aiming to be one of the most influential role players in international affairs by 2025 
(DIRCO, 2011).  In order to achieve this foreign policy objective, South Africa has 
outlined strategies which, among others, include its focus on the continent in line 
with the ‘African Agenda’ (Landsberg & Kondlo, 2007).  In relation to its strategy in 
Africa, South Africa identifies regional integration and conflict resolution as crucial 
in achieving its national interests (Landsberg, 2009; South African Defence Review, 
2015).  As such, the draft white paper on foreign policy underlines that South Africa 
will continue to be a significant actor in Africa’s conflict prevention, peacekeeping, 
peacebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction efforts (DIRCO, 2011). 
As at 31 December 2016 there were 16 UN peace missions globally with nine of 
those peace missions taking place on the African continent.  In this regard, South 
Africa is ranked the number 19 troop contributor globally and as number 11 in 
Africa.  Since 1999, South Africa has participated in no less than 14 UN and AU 
peace missions (United Nations, 2017).  It is also important to note that the UN 
Force Commander of the largest peace mission MONUSCO at the time of this study 
was a South African, Lieutenant General Derrick Mgwebi (Conwell, 2016). 
Based on South Africa’s commitment to peace missions on the continent, it is 
therefore deemed appropriate to conduct a scholarly study of South Africa’s 
approach to peace missions and the motivation behind its participation.  It was 
anticipated that a study of this nature would contribute to the existing body of 
scholarly literature on an aspect of South Africa’s foreign policy, particularly in 
relation to peace missions.  It was not the intention that the study would analyse 
peace missions as a subject of scholarly enquiry but, instead, as an outcome of 
foreign policy and practice.  It was thus necessary to start the literature review with 
an investigation into background of South Africa’s foreign policy in Africa. 
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2.2. SOURCES OF SOUTH AFRICAN FOREIGN POLICY IN AFRICA 
South Africa became a democracy in 1994 after many years of colonisation and 
apartheid.  Between 1948 and 1994 South Africa’s foreign policy was centred on 
justifying and defending the apartheid regime which had segregated the white’s 
minority groups from the black majority population (Schraeder, 2001).  
Consequently, the apartheid regime was ostracised by the international community 
due to its domestic policy of apartheid and its confrontational attitude towards the 
African populations and its neighbouring countries respectively (Borer & Mills, 
2011).  It was only after the election of the democratic government in 1994 that the 
new South Africa embarked on a mission of transforming its foreign policy from an 
isolationist stance to that of a responsible global citizen (Khadiagala & Nganje, 
2015; Nathan, 2005).  
It is against the background of its colonial and apartheid heritage that South Africa’s 
foreign policy has since been premised on the promotion of human rights, 
democracy, conflict resolution and African renaissance through multilateral forums 
(Alden & Le Pere, 2004; Schraeder, 2001).  Central to the realisation of its African 
renaissance agenda goals is the achievement of political stability, peace and security 
as a prerequisite for Africa’s socio-economic development (Landsberg, 2009).  
Consequently, South Africa’s participation in peace missions is driven primarily by 
its national interest of seeing the African continent becoming competitive in the 
issues relevant to global affairs (Vale & Maseko, 1998; Venter, 2001).  Thus, peace 
missions became a foreign policy activity aimed at realising South Africa’s national 
interests of contributing to the peace and stability of the African continent (Williams, 
2000).  This is based on the understanding that a peaceful and stable Africa will 
create the environment required for Africa’s economic development which, in turn, 
is a precondition to Africa’s becoming a competitive global player (DIRCO, 2011). 
2.3. INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AS A CONCEPT OF SCHOLARLY 
ENQUIRY 
There is still no consensus among scholars on how best to define the concept 
International Relations (IR).  However, as a concept of scholarly enquiry, IR may be 
explained as the study of the web of relations made up of cross border interaction 
between  both state and non-state actors (Schieder & Spindler, 2014).  As such, it 
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involves an analysis of “who gets what, when, and how” in the globalised world 
(Henderson, 1998, p. 20).  At the state level it is usually the state that is responsible 
for deciding on who gets ‘what, when and how’. However, at the international level 
there is no central authority, thus leaving each state to fend for itself (Von Beyme, 
2011).  This lack of central authority is referred to as the “anarchic nature of the 
international system” and resulting in the notion of the “survival of the fittest” on the 
part of states in their conduct of their international affairs (Milner, 1991, p. 69). 
The practice of international relations is as old as humanity itself.  The roots of its 
practice may be traced back several centuries, starting from the biblical stories of 
relations between the Israelites and the Egyptians to the era of the Greek city-states, 
Roman and Chinese empires and the writings of Sun Tzu and Niccolo Machiavelli 
(Henderson, 1998).  However, as a subject of academic enquiry, the study of IR 
became in the twentieth century which saw the two World Wars and the Cold War 
era (Smith, 2013).  IR is an academic discipline that is used mainly to explain the 
nature of cross boarder relations between states and how such relations are 
conducted. 
A careful analysis of the ‘Melian dialogue’ during the Peloponnesian War, as 
articulated by Thucydides, reveals that initially the study of IR was focused on the 
“analysis of the causes of war and the conditions for peace” (Smith, 2013, p. 1).  
However, IR later evolved into the study of the way in which authority and/or power 
are used to organise and manage trans-border relations between actors and how this, 
in turn, contributes to the establishment, maintenance and transformation of order in 
the world systems. 
The Melian Dialogue further revels that, in its classical form; the study of IR 
involved the analysis of the state and its representatives/institutions as the main, 
important actors in international relations.  Most contemporary scholars still agree 
with a view that states continue to be important actors in IR although they add that 
non-state actors are equally as important and have gained prominence in cross-
border relations (McGowan, Cornelissen, & Nel, 2006). 
It is necessary to take note that there is a distinction between ‘international relations’ 
written with small letters and ‘International Relations’ written with capital letters 
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(Van Nieuwkerk, 2006).  This distinction is also emphasised by McGowan et al. 
(2006) who point out that IR with capital letters refers to the academic subject while 
international relations with small letters refers to events in IR.  Thus, International 
Relations involves scholars of IR observing and analysing the relations between 
states or international actors.  IR is therefore the “theory and methods which 
researchers [use in their] analysis of the discipline of IR” (Van Nieuwkerk, 2006, p. 
23). 
The understanding of IR theory was imperative in this study because it influences 
how IR scholars use “concepts, models and paradigms to interpret and explain their 
understanding of the world and its social dynamics” (Van Nieuwkerk, 2006, p. 24).  
There are several theories of IR including, but not limited to, critical theory, realism, 
idealism, constructivism, post-colonialism, globalism and structuralism (Dunne, 
Kurki, & Smith, 2013).  There is no superior theoretical approach in IR and any one 
of these theories is as important as the others. Thus, the choice of theory depends on 
the subject of enquiry (Schieder & Spindler, 2014).  For the purposes of this study 
classical realism and idealism were chosen as appropriate theories in terms of which 
to analyse South Africa’s motivation for its participation in peace missions. These 
theories were deemed to be the most suitable theories for explaining foreign policy 
behaviour and the motives for foreign policy actions. 
A realist and an idealist may analyse the same facts in the Melian dialogue but will 
arrive at a different conclusion on what caused the war and what the conditions for 
peace were.  The same applies when analysing state motivation for participating in 
peace missions.  It is for this reason, among others, that it is essential that IR students 
understand IR theories in order to be able to assess the school of thought the IR 
scholar is using to interpret world events and also to understand the theories that 
underpin their own world view of international affairs (Van Nieuwkerk, 2006).  In 
short, in order to understand states’ cross-border interactions and their foreign policy 
activities, one needs to understand the basic assumptions of the theories used in IR 
(McGowan et al., 2006). 
There are three main, basic levels of analysis in the study of IR, namely, the state 
level, the institutional level and the individual level of analysis (Henderson, 1998).  
All these levels are present in the international domain.  However; the difference is 
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the focus of the main actors in IR at the level of analysis in question (Mingst, 2008).  
For example, an analysis of South Africa’s participation in peace missions may be 
conducted at any of the three levels mentioned above.  At an individual level, IR 
scholars may focus on the role of former President Mbeki in his spearheading South 
Africa’s participation in peace missions and starting with his belief in the African 
Renaissance Agenda that led to the NEPAD framework and the evolution of the 
OAU into the AU and, later, the adoption of the ASF concept as a mechanism for 
peace and stability on the continent (Venter, 2001; Von Beyme, 2011). 
At the state level of analysis, the focus is on South Africa as a state using its state 
machinery (SANDF) to contribute to conflict resolutions on the continent.  In this 
research study the state machinery concerned was the deployment of the SANDF in 
peace missions.  Finally, the system level of analysis may be either global or sub 
regional.  In this case one could focus on South Africa’s participation in peace 
mission through multilateral organisations such as the UN or the AU (Hague & 
Harrop, 2001).  The focus in this research study was on the state level of analysis 
because the study concentrated on South Africa’s approach to peace missions and its 
motivation for participating in these peace missions. 
2.4. INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORIES (IDEALISM VS 
REALISM) 
The extent and the devastation that followed World War I (WWI) (1914–18) sparked 
a paradigmatic revolution in the study of IR with several schools of thoughts 
competing for attention.  Idealism emerged as the dominant view.  This school of 
thought advocates that people are, by nature, good.  The proponents of idealism 
argued that the wicked behaviour that  led to the catastrophic events of WW I had 
been the result of structural arrangements that motivated people to act in their own 
self-interest (Kegley & Wittkopf, 1995.  After WW I, IR became concerned 
primarily with diplomatic issues, thus attempting to prevent a similar war and hence 
the formation of the League of Nations in 1920. 
The idealist scholars are more optimistic about change than their realist counterparts 
are willing to accept.  Acknowledging that the international system is, by nature, 
anarchic, idealists argued that humans are, by nature, good and, with the appropriate 
international institutions, such as the League of Nations (later the UN), that should 
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aim to create a conducive environment for peaceful and independent global systems, 
there were prospects for change for the change (Couloumbis & Wolfe, 1982).  This 
argument drew much criticism and it was based on this reaction, especially after the 
failure of the League of Nations to prevent World War II (WWII), that realism 
emerged as a dominant theory in IR.  
Unlike idealists, realists argue that change is not possible but that the continuity of 
history and wars will always remain a feature in international relations due to the 
anarchic nature of the international system (Viotti & Kauppi, 1993).  Realists further 
argue that states strive to maximise their power and wealth and that, unless a balance 
of power is established, war will remain an ongoing feature of the international 
system as states resort to their military apparatus either to defend themselves or to 
acquire wealth and power (McGowan et al., 2006).  As already indicated, the 
theoretical bases that was used analyse South Africa’s motivation behind it 
participation in peace mission is both realism and idealism.  As a result, it was 
imperative to discuss the basic assumptions of idealism and realism in detail. 
2.4.1. Idealism vs Realism 
The review of the literature revealed that there are various theories in IR.  For the 
purpose of this research study; the focus was on realism and idealism only as the 
theories used for analysing South Africa’s foreign policy in respect of its 
participation in peace missions.  Like other theories in the study of IR both realism 
and idealism are founded on certain basic assumptions.  The following basic 
assumptions are made by realists and idealists alike and have been applied in the 
effort to understand South Africa’s participation in peace missions as an outcome of 
South Africa’s foreign policy decision making process that culminates into policy 
action. 
The Basic Features of Human Nature and Characteristics of the International 
System 
The first assumption of realism is that states, just like the human beings who rule 
them, “are selfish actors who always seek to maximise their own interest” 
(McGowan et al., 2006, pp.28).  This individualist behaviour of states is perpetuated 
by the lack of central authority in the global system.  Due to this anarchic nature of 
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the international system “statesmen [within the international arena] think and act in 
terms of interests [of their own respective states] defined in terms of power” even if 
this is achieved at the expense of other states (Morgenthau, 1978, pp. 4–5). 
In principle, idealists tend to agree with realists on the basic anarchic nature of the 
international system.  However, they disagree that the absence of a global authority, 
as realists suggest, condemns actors to perpetual competition for their individual 
(state) interests.  Idealists argue that, even in the absence of a global central 
authority, nations or states have found ways in which to cooperate on issues that 
affect all states and also humanity at large (Heywood, 2011).  For example, idealists 
would argue that the abolishment of slavery, adoption of the UN Charter, 
cooperation on climate change and other international laws prove that states 
cooperate in more ways than realists are willing to admit (Nel, 2006). 
Distribution of Power 
Realists believe that the distribution of power is extremely important in international 
relations.  They agree that, in principle, states have sovereign equality in terms of 
international law although they are also quick to point out that states are not always 
equal in terms of power (military strength, size of the economy, geographical and 
population size) and dominance (Daddow, 2009).  Realists argue that states which, in 
their view, are the most important actors in international relations, spend most of 
their time and effort in trying to maximise their power, dominance and influence 
(Russell, 1994).  They are of the opinion that those states with economic and military 
supremacy are able to impose their will on the less powerful states.  In other words, 
it is incumbent on any state that wishes to have influence in global affairs to 
maximise its economic and military strength.  As a result, weaker states attempt to 
strengthen their economic and military dominance in order to become more powerful 
and so, in turn, to acquire global influence and gain respect.  Another strategy is to 
align themselves with powerful states so that they have some form of protection 
from a powerful counterpart (Daddow, 2009). 
However, idealists challenge the notion that power distribution is the most prominent 
factor that determines the outcome of a phenomenon.  For those who subscribe to 
this school of thought, power is only one of the factors that contribute to the way in 
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which states influence each other.  Thus, in analysing the conflict between India and 
Pakistani, for example, idealists go beyond looking for answers within the context of 
either the balance of power or the lack thereof and, instead, they seek explanations in 
terms of factors such as misperceptions and misunderstandings of each other’s 
intentions in the hostile relationship between India and Pakistan (Nel, 2006, p. 33). 
The Role of Moral Beliefs in the Practice of International Relations  
Realists are not convinced that there is a role for moral considerations in the conduct 
of international relations as liberals would argue.  It is not that realists do not 
“necessarily believe in moral principles themselves” but they do believe that the 
basic anarchic nature of the international system does not permit actors to act in 
moral ways (Nel, 2006, p. 30).  This view is further reinforced by Kegley and 
Wittkopf (1995) who argue that the most important principle in international 
relations is that of ‘self-help’.  To this end, states are ultimately dependent on their 
own resources to pursue national interest and power and, hence, there is no place for 
moral considerations (Morgenthau, 1978). 
On the other hand, idealists value the role of morality in international relations than 
realists are willing to accept.  Idealist look back to historical international events 
which were characterised by mutual cooperation to support their claim of morality in 
international relations.  They argue that it was the result of humanity and the ability 
of humans to make morally conscious decisions that slavery was abolished and the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights was adopted in 1948.  Idealists also view 
international donor aid as an act of altruism and cite acts of morality in international 
relations.  They further argue that states participate in peacekeeping due to moral 
considerations and are incapable of letting others suffer the scourge of conflict if 
they are able to offer help (Nel, 2006). 
Actors in International Relations 
It is clear from the three main assumptions discussed in the preceding sections that 
realists identify the state as the main actor in international relations (Neack, 2008).  
However, this is not to say that realists disregard the importance of non-state actors 
such as prominent individuals, multinational cooperation, international organisations 
and non-governmental organisations (NGOs), but they do single out states as the 
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most important actors in international politics (Morgenthau, 1978).  Realists advance 
reasons for their views such as the state is the only legitimate entity that controls and 
has the power to wage wars on behalf of its citizens (Nel, 2006).  On the other hand, 
realists agree that, in the contemporary era, the non-traditional actors have growing 
influence in international relations but nevertheless still maintaining that “on the 
balance, states remain the major coercive and regulatory institution in the world” 
(Nel, 2006, p. 31). 
Advocates of idealism also concur with their realist counterparts that the state is 
undeniably an extremely important actor in the international system but they argue 
that it should not be regarded as the most important one (Heywood, 2007).  Idealists 
suggest that there are numerous international actors that interact together to produce 
the very anarchic nature of the international system (Neack, 2008).  This argument 
reveals that it is impossible to predict which actor will be the most important actor 
before the actual occurrence of a particular event and, thus, which actor will be the 
most important will depend on the issue at hand.  For example, in international 
economic affairs the state is no longer the sole or most important actor and, in fact, 
multinational companies (MNCs) and financial institutions such as the World Bank 
and International Monetary Fund (IMF) have become the more dominant, if not the 
most important, actors (Gilpin & Gilpin, 2001). 
The Degree and Direction of Change in International Relations 
The final basic assumption of realists is that there is a continuity (of history) in the 
international system and thus any hope of change is unrealistic (Nel, 2006).  Thus, 
realists believe that fundamental changes to the structure of the international system 
are unlikely, even if desirable.  For realists, “the international system is [and will 
continue to be] characterised by conflict, suspicion and competition between nation-
states” (Burchill, 2005, p. 32).  It is further pointed out that inter-state affairs are still 
much in line with inter-state affairs as conducted during the period of antiquity.  For 
realists, as long as there is no balance of power, wars and conflict will remain a 
feature of the international system. 
Idealists dispute the realist view on the basic continuity of events and the conduct of 
states in international relations, arguing that the world is no longer the way it was 
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during the Peloponnesian Wars, slavery and colonisation.  Due to the continuing 
interdependence of states within the international system as a result of globalisation, 
things have changed for better and will continue to improve as international actors 
seek better ways in which to coexist within the international system (Nel, 2006). 
2.5. FOREIGN POLICY: A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
The preceding sections have discussed IR as a subject of scholarly enquiry.  In 
addition, it was explained that the approach to studying IR is based on certain 
theories of which the most dominant theories are realism and idealism.  These 
theories are founded on certain basic assumptions as discussed above.  The next 
section critically analyses what foreign policy is and what informs it. 
Unfortunately, like many concepts in social sciences, there is little consensus of what 
foreign policy is, thus leaving its meaning open to several interpretations.  The 
concept of foreign policy may, for example, include ECOWAS negotiating with 
former Gambian dictator, Yahya Jammeh, to persuade him to leave office peacefully 
after his electoral defeat, South Africa’s inclusion in BRICS, Kenya’s withdrawal 
from the International Criminal Court (ICC) or Donal Trump threatening to build a 
wall between the USA and Mexico (Hill, 2003). 
Foreign policy may be defined as “the sum of official external relations conducted 
by an independent actor (usually a state) in international relations” (Hill, 2003, p. 3).  
Thus, foreign policy is the “discrete purposeful action that results from the political 
level discussion of an individual or group of individuals … [it is] the observable 
artefact of political level decision.  It is not the decision, but a product of decision” 
(Neack, 2008, p. 9).  In other words, foreign policy includes those intentions, 
statements and actions of an actor (often a state) directed towards the external world 
and the responses of the other actors to these intentions, statements and actions 
(Neack, 2008). 
Habib (2009), citing Morgenthau, proposes a neo-realist and idealist definition of 
foreign policy.  Neo-realists adopt a state centric view by defining foreign policy as 
the “product of national interests and nations ‘structural location’ in the international 
system” (Habib, 2009, p. 145).  The neo-realist’s nemesis, the idealists, agree with 
this definition but argue further that other variables, including business, political 
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actors and NGOs also need to be seen as playing a crucial role in shaping foreign 
policy.  From the idealist’ point of view, even though the state plays an important 
role in foreign policy, it is not the sole actor (Habib, 2009). 
Policy is the sum of these ‘official relations’ in order to avoid the creation of 
separate foreign policy by the individual actions of the actors.  Such policy is 
‘foreign’ as the world is not a single homogenised entity and is separated into unique 
communities.  In short, a community (in this case both state and non-state actors) 
formulates strategies to deal with foreign communities (Hill, 2003).  Policy is further 
understood by Venter and Landsberg (2006, p. 251) to mean a “purposive or oriented 
course of action, pursued by decision makers of a state, based on a set of social 
values, to solve matters of public concern, on the basis of clear goals to be 
achieved”. 
Thus, foreign policy comprises a carefully planned course of action and strategies 
designed by the policy makers of a state and laying out how they will relate with 
other states or multilateral agencies in international relations.  In other words, foreign 
policy is a policy action directed towards foreign parties, be they state or non-state 
actors, and intended to secure economic, political and social interests (Venter & 
Landsberg, 2006).  However, foreign policy is not unilateral because it focuses on 
the intentions, actions and statements of actor(s) in relation to another and the latter’s 
response.  When a state acts in relation to other foreign entities the state expects 
some form of feedback (Neack, 2008).  Thus, foreign policy refers to the process of 
setting the goals and objectives which a state perceives as paramount on behalf of its 
society, whether internal and/or external security; wealth creation, the search for 
prestige or status in the global order, establishing and protecting its ethnic identity or 
religiosity; or an attempt to achieve the universality of certain values to transform the 
international political order (Venter & Landsberg, 2006). 
It is clear from these definitions that it suffices to agree with Van Nieuwkerk (2006, 
p. 28) who argued that foreign policy analysis (FPA) is dominated by realists’ 
connotations because it mainly “focuses on the analysis of state behaviour in the 
international context”.  This is because initially, or at least, when scholars began 
theorising about foreign policy, the main actors or initiators of foreign policy were 
the heads of states and state institutions.  However, there is an admission in the 
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contemporary era that non-state actors are equally important in matters of foreign 
policy (McGowan et al., 2006).  However, in the final analysis, despite the fact that 
other non-traditional actors have been given space in matters of foreign relations, it 
is the state, through its government institutions, that remains the chief architect of 
international relations.  
For example, in South Africa, the formulation of foreign policy is primarily the 
responsibility of DIRCO in conjunction with the Presidency (Landsberg & Monyae, 
2006).  Nevertheless, there are several other actors involved in both foreign policy 
formulation and implementation.  For instance, other key role players in foreign 
policy include, among others, the Ministries of Defence, Home Affairs, Tourism and 
Trade and Industry as well as civil society, business and eminent persons such as 
Emeritus Bishop Desmond Tutu (Landsberg & Van Wyk, 2012).  
In most instances, foreign policy is informed by domestic policy.  What states 
attempt to achieve abroad by establishing relations with the outside world is also 
aimed at achieving government objectives within the state (Neack, 2008).  During 
the apartheid era, the ‘policy of isolation’ was informed by the state obsession to 
protect the regime from collapsing.  Accordingly, it was necessary for the apartheid 
regime to embark on the bombardment of neighbouring countries in order to 
destabilise the liberation movements and weaken their support (Schraeder, 2001).  
Equally so, during Nelson Mandela’s era, the policy of reconciliation was informed 
by the need to rebuild South Africa and reconstruct social cohesion within the 
country.  Thus, South Africa’s foreign policy has been transformed from its 
isolationist orientation to an inclusive and global orientation; driven by the 
promotion of democracy, advocating for human rights and pursuit of peace and 
stability (Nathan, 2005). 
It is clear from the literature reviewed that, as much as states and other non-
traditional foreign policy actors have a prominent role in matters of foreign relations, 
it is equally important to understand the role of individuals in international relations.  
These individual actors may be acting on behalf of the state or not.  In the 
introductory section of chapter 1, the paper highlighted the key roles of Mandela and 
Mbeki in steering South African foreign policy in a particular direction.  The third 
generation scholars of FPA argue that the findings of any analysis of international 
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relations that does not recognise or study the role and influence of individuals in 
foreign policy are likely to be flawed (Hudson & Vore, 1995). 
Any attempt to analyse South’s African foreign policy during Mandela’s presidency 
without studying the role of Mandela himself would not reach a true understanding 
and reflection of what informed South Africa’s foreign policy at that time.  The same 
applies to Mbeki and his African renaissance agenda which was at the forefront of 
South African foreign policy during his tenure but which withered when President 
Jacob Zuma came to power (Alden & Schoeman, 2015).  The analysis of dominant 
individuals or ‘strong men’ is important, especially on the African continent where it 
has been observed that those at the helm of the state tend to exclusively dominate the 
formulation and implementation of foreign policy in their respective countries.  It is, 
indeed, for this reason that the decision-making approach of FPA breaks apart the 
monolithic view of states as the sole and unitary actors in international relations 
(Hudson & Vore, 1995). 
2.6. THE CONCEPT OF PEACEKEEPING 
In order to understand the rationale for South Africa’s participation in African, it is 
perhaps helpful to establish what peacekeeping is and why should there be 
peacekeeping.  Peacekeeping is one of the conflict resolution mechanisms employed 
to keep peace between warring parties.  It is usually a primary tool reserved for the 
UN to use to settle disputes as prescribed in the UN Charter although it may also be 
delegated to regional and sub-regional bodies such as the AU and SADC (Hoffmann, 
2001; United Nations, 1945). 
In order to understand conflict resolution and some of its mechanisms, one needs to 
understand the concepts and tools required for the analysis of the conflict and the 
mechanisms available through which to resolve conflict (Wallensteen, 2012).  Thus, 
conflict theory and peace studies, under which the study of peacekeeping also falls, 
clarify the concepts and tools required for the analysis of the causes of conflict and 
how to resolve conflict (ACCORD, 2015).  It is not the purpose of this research 
project to study conflict theory and, hence, it will not be discussed in detail at this 
point.  This paper focuses mainly on peacekeeping as an instrument of foreign policy 
decision and action and, hence, the next section attempts to unpack the concept of 
peacekeeping. 
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Peacekeeping is one of the most misused terms in peace studies.  The fact that 
peacekeeping has been left to the military and foreign policy practitioners has 
culminated in the lack of an in-depth, theoretical analysis of what peacekeeping is 
(Bellamy, 2004; Orth, 1996).  This, in turn, has led to analytical confusion because it 
would seem that what peacekeeping is left to the interpretation of those who are 
talking about it at a particular point in time.  This confusion has rendered 
peacekeeping a concept which is difficult to carry out a proper analysis in scholarly 
terms.  The situation was exacerbated by the fact that, at the end of the cold war era, 
“a seemingly confusing array of concepts and terms were used regarding the scope 
and meaning of peacekeeping” (Neethling, 2003b, p. 96).  In most cases, 
peacekeeping, peace missions, peace support operations and peace-making are 
sometimes used erroneously used interchangeably (Neethling, 2012). 
For example, the UN use the term ‘peacekeeping’ and defines it as “the deployment 
of international military and civilian personnel to a conflict area with consent of 
parties to the conflict and/or national authorities, in order to contain hostilities or 
supervise the carrying out of a peace agreement” (Dorn, 2011, p. 8).  On the other 
hand, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) prefers to use the term ‘Peace 
Support Operations (PSO)’ and defines it as “an operation that impartially makes use 
of diplomatic, civil or military means, usually in pursuit of UN Charter purposes and 
principles to restore or maintain peace (Dorn, 2011, p. 5).  Diehl (1994, p. 4) refers 
to peacekeeping as any “effort involving an operational component to promote the 
termination of armed conflict or the resolutions of long standing dispute”. 
However, the definitions mentioned above all have serious shortcomings.  
Understandably so and recognising the context of the time, Diehl’s (1994) definition 
concentrates on ending armed hostilities only.  However, peacekeeping or peace 
missions, as referred in this paper, have since evolved to include preventative 
diplomacy, peace-making and peace building.  The UN definition emphasises the 
consent of the belligerents and/or host governments.  Nevertheless, the Rwandan 
genocide has forced the international community to reconsider its stance on the 
principle of consent.  Consequently, in exceptional circumstances, such as instances 
of genocide, gross violation of human rights, ethnic cleansing and other related war 
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crimes, the UN no longer requires the consent of the belligerent parties to become 
involved (Hoffmann, 2001). 
The main reason for this change is the recognition and global consensus that the 
international community, through the UN, has a responsibility to protect civilians in 
conflict affected areas (Johnstone, 2011).  The shortcomings in the NATO definition 
and the way they are put into practice are the emphasis on the use of the armed 
forces as a tool to achieve peaceful ends. However; experiences in Libya and 
Afghanistan have once again proved to the international community, policy makers 
and scholars of conflict resolutions and peace studies that prioritising robust military 
intervention without meaningful dialogue between the aggrieved parties and 
improving governance is unlikely to bring about long-term peace and stability. 
The confusion regarding a proper definition of peacekeeping has led to some misuse 
of the concept.  Some have also used this weakness to disguised themselves as 
peacekeepers in order to achieve their own narrow political ends while pretending 
that their main objective is the restoration and maintenance of international peace 
(Diehl, 1994).  This claim is supported by the example of the United States of 
America’s (USA) invasion of Grenada.  The USA troops invaded Grenada under the 
guise of a PSO and they were referred to as the ‘Caribbean Peacekeeping Forces’ 
even although they had not been mandated by the UN or any other authorised body 
(Diehl, 1994).  Furthermore, Ronald Reagan labelled the MX Missile the 
‘Peacekeeper’, thus adding to the confusion of exactly what peacekeeping is. 
In an attempt to clarify the conceptual confusion on what peacekeeping is, Bellamy 
(2004) has identified three roles which peacekeeping is supposed to fulfil.  Firstly, 
peacekeeping is a mechanism to resolve conflict without the involvement of the cold 
war super powers, thus limiting the potential for escalation as experienced during the 
cold war era.  For instance, during the cold war era it was easy for a conflict to 
escalate through the involvement of the USA and the Soviet Union as when the 
global community witnessed the escalation and prolonged conflict in Angola where 
the super powers took sides in supporting UNITA and the MPLA. 
Secondly, peacekeeping mobilises the international community in a united effort to 
end hostilities and maintain peace between warring parties through multilateral 
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forums.  It is conducted on the multilateral platforms such as the UN and AU and in 
terms of which countries are able to hold each other accountable and demand from 
their counterparts adherence to international laws without being accused of meddling 
in each other’s internal affairs (Pevehouse, 2002).  Finally, peacekeeping opens up a 
diplomatic window for further negotiations aimed at achieving long term peace.  It 
must, however, be noted that peacekeeping is but one of the mechanisms available to 
resolve armed dispute but that its aim is to open up space for peaceful negotiations 
that will lead to long term, sustainable peace and stability (Bellamy, 2004). 
Bellamy’s (2004) conceptual clarification helps to highlight that peacekeeping is a 
broad concept involving several activities but that all are aimed at ending hostilities 
and establishing and maintaining peace.  This implies that all conflict resolution 
mechanisms such as PSO; peace enforcement; peace making and peacebuilding are 
often used interchangeably but that all describe UN activities aimed at restoring or 
maintaining peace and stability as determined by the UN Charter.  Diehl (2008) 
noted the same confusion and interchangeability of terms, arguing that it is common 
for the concepts mentioned by Neethling (2003b) to be used interchangeably.  
However, the most preferred term used by most scholars and analysts alike is 
‘peacekeeping missions’ as this term encompasses everything from preventative 
diplomacy, peace enforcement to post-conflict recovery (Neethling, 2003a). 
The South African government and the Department of Defence (DoD) in particular 
prefer to use the term ‘Peace Support Operations’ which is also used by NATO. This 
preference is reflected in most government policy documents including the White 
Paper on Defence for the Republic of South Africa: Defence in Democracy (1996), 
White Paper on Peace Support Operations (1999) and the South African Defence 
Review (2015).  South Africa’s adoption of the NATO definition was influenced by 
the attempt to make a conceptual distinction between military operations and other 
diplomatic engagements – a distinction which is extremely difficult in practice 
(Cilliers, Shaw, & Mills, 1995).  There is a consensus that all measures aimed at 
conflict prevention, management and resolutions are, in essence, political and/or 
diplomatic (with the military playing a supporting role only) and that the word 
‘operations’ inevitably created an impression of a military activity, hence the 
preferred use of the term ‘peacekeeping’ (Neethling, 2003a). 
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It is worth noting that most of the literature consulted uses both ‘peace support 
missions’ and/or ‘peacekeeping missions’ as these terms encompasse all the role 
players attempting to settle international disputes in whatever capacity, whether they 
are part of a military or civilian component (Neethling, 1997).  According to the UN 
operational definition, peace missions/peacekeeping include everything from 
preventative diplomacy, peace-making, peace-building, peace enforcements and all 
activities sanctioned under the UN Charter in the effort to maintain, restore and/or 
enforce international peace and stability (United Nations, 2008).  For the purpose of 
this research report, the term peace missions and peacekeeping are used 
interchangeably. 
2.7. PRINCIPLES OF PEACEKEEPING 
Peacekeeping in practice is equally contested with peacekeeping as a theoretical 
concept of scholarly enquiry.  In the interests of effective peacekeeping in the field 
of operations, the UN, as the chief custodian of peace and security, has laid down 
three fundamental principles to guide both the policy makers and peacekeepers in the 
theatre of operations. 
The principle of the consent of the parties to the conflict is the first fundamental 
principle of any UN sanctioned peace mission and also applies to the regional and 
sub-regional bodies participating in peace missions (Langholtz, 2010).  This 
principle of consent implies that the UN must seek the consent of the belligerent 
parties involved in the conflict before embarking on any peace missions.  In the 
African context, the parties concerned are usually the incumbent government and 
some armed ‘rebel’ groups involved in violet hostilities.  Consent ensures that the 
UN peacekeeping force is given the freedom to carry out its mission and that it is 
protected while carrying out its mandate.  The principle of consent is based on the 
premise that the UN peacekeeping force risks becoming a party to the conflict if one 
or both parties to the conflict resist the involvement of the peacekeeping force 
(Nationen, 2012). 
It is worth noting that the genocide in Rwandan and the Balkans in the early 1990s 
taught both the UN and the international community a valuable lesson regarding the 
shortcomings of the principle of consent.  As a response to the said genocide and 
gross violation of human rights the UN adopted the Right2Protect (R2P) and has 
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since made provisions to allow interventions in certain circumstances without the 
consent of the parties to the conflict (Evans, 2001).  Accordingly, the UN now 
reserves the right to intervene in any conflict situation with or without the consent of 
the belligerents in cases where there is a gross violation of human rights, genocide 
and/or ethnic cleansing (Evans, 2001).  The AU also made amendments to Article 
4(h) in line with the UN but added that it will intervene in a member state where 
there is a serious threat to legitimate order (i.e. military coupe) for the purpose of 
restoring peace and stability and intervening to stop war crimes and crimes against 
humanity (Baimu & Sturman, 2003). 
The second principle of peacekeeping is that peacekeepers must carry out their 
mandate in an impartial manner and without favouring one party over the other.  
Impartiality does not necessarily mean that peacekeepers are ‘neutral’ but that it is 
expected of them to apply the same principles to all parties to the conflict while 
implementing their mandate.  Impartiality ensures that the peacekeeping force 
protect its legitimacy in the mission area (Nationen, 2012). 
Lastly, the peacekeepers must “refrain from the use of force except in defence of 
their mandate and self-protection” (Nationen, 2012, p. 14).  Thus, peacekeepers are 
allowed to use limited force only against ‘spoilers of peace’ and only with 
authorisation from the UNSC.  Such limited force shall be used as a last resort when 
defending UN property, personnel and the mandate and only after exhausting all 
possible peaceful means to achieve the same end without the use of force.  At the 
same time, when the peacekeepers resort to the use of force in defence of the 
mandate, the force must be proportional to that of the belligerents. 
The three principles discussed still are still in place and are adhered to by the UN 
when it carries out peace missions.  However, the UN has recently been willing to 
use robust military force to enforce peace and restore political stability.  A case in 
point was the authorisation to deploy the FIB in the eastern DRC, the no fly-zone in 
Libya after resolution 1973 and, recently, the authorisation of ECOWAS to use 
military force to remove Yahya Jammeh after he had refused to hand over power in 
the Gambia.  South Africa, under the auspices of SADC, also used military force to 
restore peace in Lesotho in 1998.  The robust military dimension of peace missions 
is an indication that peace missions have evolved from the traditional pacifist 
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approach to a multidimensional approach which makes provision for ‘robust 
military’ intervention as a mechanism to restore peace and stability. 
2.8. EVOLUTION OF PEACE MISSIONS 
Traditionally, peace missions were envisaged as managing inter-state war which had 
the potential to disturb global peace (Woodhouse, 2010).  Peace missions were 
carried out by lightly armed soldiers from neutral countries who formed a buffer 
between two opposing countries armies to create space for negotiations to restore 
peace.  The aim of these types of peace missions, known as first generation peace 
missions, was to conduct operations without enforcement powers, to help maintain 
and to restore peace in conflict affected areas.  In these first-generation peace 
missions, military personnel doubled as diplomats in conflict areas with the 
responsibility to monitor, supervise, and verify the implementation of peace 
agreements.  These peace missions were authorised by the UNSC as per Chapter VI 
(peaceful settlement of disputes) of the UN Charter (Sloan, 2014). 
The end of the Cold War brought a new dimension to the conflicts taking place 
around the world with inter-state conflict declining drastically while intra-state 
conflicts were on the increase.  Not only did the main belligerents change from those 
of state armies against other state armies but the intra-state conflict belligerents often 
comprised a state army against a section of the population.  The character of the 
victims of war also changed as it was not the armed soldiers who were dying in 
numbers but unarmed civilians, especially the vulnerable groups such as women, 
children and the elderly. 
These new developments in the character of the intra-state conflict forced the UN to 
adopt a different approach to peace missions.  The intra-state conflict required an 
innovative approach to peace missions to deal not only with the restoration of peace 
and stability but also to address the challenges of internally displaced persons, 
famine and civilian casualties.  Accordingly, the UNSC started to pass several 
resolutions to deal with the new, complex operation that required a multi-
dimensional approach to addressing the new challenges.  These multi-dimensional 
peace missions, also known as second-generation peace missions, required not only 
the deployment of military personnel but also authorised the deployment of police 
and civilian personnel in order to address the complex security situation. 
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It must, however, be added that the second-generation, multidimensional peace 
missions did not necessarily authorise the use of force by peacekeepers to address 
the fighting between the belligerents but, instead, that the aim of the new additions 
was to address the needs of the vulnerable civilians affected by the conflict while, at 
the same time, trying to protect these vulnerable groups.  The Rwandan Genocide 
proved to the international community that there is, indeed, a need to authorise 
armed response to conflict in order to protect the vulnerable groups and, for the AU, 
also to protect the legitimate, democratically elected regimes from insurgents 
(Cilliers & Sturman, 2002).   
The AU’s intention to establish the ASF is a clear intention that the African 
continent is willing to embrace the organisational culture change from the non-
intervention cherished by its predecessor, the OAU, to intervention when necessary.  
The ASF was designed with six scenarios in mind: from scenario 1 (deals with 
military advice to a political mission) to scenario 6 (AU interventions) (P. D. 
Williams, 2006).  
2.9. THE RATIONALE FOR SOUTH AFRICA’S PARTICIPATION IN 
PEACE MISSIONS 
A quick perusal of the main elements and underlying principles of South Africa’s 
foreign policy as outlined in the White Paper on South Africa’s Foreign Policy and, 
in particular, the section that elaborates on South Africa’s position towards Africa, 
may prematurely mislead one to conclude that South Africa’s participation in peace 
missions is driven primarily by the altruistic and humanist approach advocated by 
classical liberals (Conwell, 2016).  However, if interrogated critically, the same 
variables may be explained in reference to both South Africa’s own national interests 
and to the growing of its international profile (Van Nieuwkerk, 2012).  As the 
realists argue, foreign policy is driven by the state’s desire to pursue its national 
interests.  This characteristic is evident in both South African foreign policy 
documents and in its actions (Van Nieuwkerk, 2004) .  South Africa’s participation 
in peace missions may also be explained in terms of both the realist and idealist 
connotations of IR. 
As a result of its miraculous and relatively peaceful negotiated settlement and the 
subsequent birth of a democratic dispensation, the international community was 
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hoping that South Africa will transfer this miracle to other parts of the continent (R. 
Williams, 2000).  The new democratic government felt compelled to participate in 
African peace missions because it felt it must attempt repay the solidarity showed to 
the new ruling party during the liberation struggle (R. Williams, 2000).  It was not 
only the oppressed people of South Africa who had felt the brunt of apartheid but 
almost all the neighbouring countries had suffered direct onslaughts and subsequent 
devastation at the hands of the apartheid regime’s military forces.  The bombardment 
of these neighbouring countries had also contributed to their underdevelopment and 
thus South Africa felt it had a moral responsibility to contribute towards the 
development of the continent.  One of the preconditions necessary for development 
is peace and security and, hence, South Africa’s participation in peace missions 
(Landsberg & Kondlo, 2007). 
In addition to South Africa’s obligation to the rest of the continent due to the role it 
played in ending apartheid, South Africa also possesses the financial and military 
capacity to assist countries in distress.  Therefore, it is both morally and ethically 
expected of the country to assist in the restoration and maintenance of peace and 
stability on the continent (R. Williams, 2000).  Senior government officials, such as 
the former Chief of the SANDF, General Nyanda, have argued that, in Africa and, in 
particular, in the SADC region, South Africa, with its all-encompassing economic, 
political and a military hegemony, is in a “position that enables it not only to largely 
participate in peace missions across the spectrum, but to also take a leading role in 
the whole domain of Africa’s renewal” (Nyanda, 2003:1).  In other words, South 
Africa may not ignore the misfortunes happening on the continent, especially after 
the international community had done so little to prevent the genocide in Rwanda 
(Neethling, 2003a). 
In view of the above observations and, in part, the rhetoric contained in the speeches 
of government leaders and that echoes the altruistic values enshrined in South 
Africa’s approach to foreign relations and peace missions, in particular, those who 
subscribe to the idealist school of thought are able to present a compelling case that, 
indeed, South Africa is participating in peace missions for the common good and it is 
not expecting any benefits in return.  However, based on a further critical analysis of 
the draft White Paper on South Africa’s Foreign Policy, realists may argue that 
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participation in peace missions not only serves the cause of Africa’s peace and 
security but, without a doubt, it also serves the advancement of South Africa’s 
national interests of exploring business opportunities, growing its economy and 
managing migration to its shores. 
The African renaissance agenda, which has been vigorously preached since Mbeki’s 
tenure, has now find expression in Zuma’s foreign policy as one of the key pillars of 
the “African Agenda” (DIRCO, 2011).  As such, effective and responsible 
participation has become a matter of national interest for South Africa.  National 
interests, as an instrument of political action, “serve[s] as a means of justifying, 
denouncing, and proposing policies” (Rosenau, 2006, p. 246).  South Africa’s 
participation in peace missions may thus be regarded as a way of pursuing its socio-
economic goals because Africa is its biggest export market and, hence, its zeal to 
stabilise the continent (Van Nieuwkerk, 2004). 
South Africa has also been accused of being a proxy of western interest and its 
involvement in peace missions has been translated by some of its critiques as a way 
of the stabilising regions where its western counterparts have economic interests 
(Van Nieuwkerk, 2012).  There are, indeed, some notable contradictions in South 
Africa’s participation in peace missions if one considers that, in some cases, it 
participates for humanistic reasons, as idealist would like to argue, but also because 
it expects to be paid back in the form of investment opportunities – a realist 
inclination.  It is worth noting that South African businesses are flourishing in 
countries where South Africa has played a role in the restoration of socio-political 
stability such as in Burundi and the DRC(Van Nieuwkerk, 2012). 
The main aim of the research paper was to explore whether there has been a shift 
from a pacifist to a more robust military approach in South Africa’s peace missions 
in Africa.  Moreover, the paper also sought to determine whether South Africa’s 
participation in peace mission is driven by either realist or idealist approach to 
foreign relations.  Before attempting is made to answer these two overarching 
research questions, the next chapter will elaborate on the research methodology 
employed in the study. 
 
Precious Pakamile Hlungwani 775032 
 
33 
Chapter 3. Research Methodology 
3.1. INTRODUCTION 
This research study explored an area of South Africa’s foreign policy which has 
already been widely studied.  Nevertheless, the approach adopted in this study was 
aimed at determining whether South Africa is attempting to shift its approach to 
peace missions from a pacifist to a more robust military approach.  This question 
arose from South Africa’s participation in the FIB in the eastern DRC and its 
insistence that the AU establish a continental, rapid intervention force in the form of 
ACIRC while waiting for the full commissioning of the ASF. 
Moreover, the paper also sought to understand the motivation for South Africa’s 
participation in peace missions.  Is this participation motivated by the principles of 
‘ubuntu’, as an idealist would claim, or is motivated by the national interest of 
exploiting economic opportunities and improving its stature on the global platform, 
as a realist would reason?  This question arose from an observation that South Africa 
has been willing to risk the lives of its citizens (SANDF troops) in some extremely 
risky military interventions such as those in the DRC, Burundi and Lesotho.  On the 
other hand, on some missions where the stakes are not so high it would appear that 
South Africa is prepared to deploy only few personnel, such as military observers, 
for example, in the Ivory Coast and the Ethiopia/Eretria conflict.  In addition, it took 
no part in peace missions such as those in Somalia and Mali. 
This chapter explains the method that was adopted to conduct this research study, the 
data gathering process and the analysis of the said data.  In addition, the chapter also 
discusses both the successes and the challenges faced by the researcher from the 
initial stages of the research to the end. 
3.2. RESEARCH PARADIGM 
Before a researcher commences with any research, it is imperative to establish the 
paradigm which the researcher intends to use to observe and/interpret the 
phenomenon he/she is going to study (Nieuwenhuis & Smit, 2012).  The researcher 
based this research study on the constructivist/interpretative paradigm.  
Constructivists believe that “knowledge is subjective because it is socially 
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constructed and mind dependent” and, hence, it is possible that those who subscribe 
to the realist and idealist schools of thought are able to observe the same foreign 
policy events but arrive at different interpretations (Chilisa & Kawulich, 2012, p. 
56). 
3.3. RESEARCH DESIGN 
The research design which was deemed appropriate and which was chosen for the 
purposes of this study was the qualitative research design.  Since it is not really 
possible to analyse policy decisions through experiments in terms of quantity and 
measurements, the researcher was forced to rely on interpreting the meaning and 
motivation of policy decision using various theoretical approaches – in this case is 
idealism and realism (Nieuwenhuis & Smit, 2012).  Thus, the qualitative design was 
deemed to be the most appropriate for critically examining South Africa’s approach 
to peace missions and what motivates such decisions.  This examination of the 
qualities and interpretations of the South Africa’s participation in peace missions 
was conducted by engaging experts in South African foreign policy, especially those 
with interests in South Africa’s involvement in peace missions.   
The research study adopted an exploratory approach in an attempt to examine 
whether South Africa was, indeed, departing from its pacifist approach to peace 
mission to a robust military approach as was observed through its response to the fall 
of Goma at the hands of the M23 and its insistence on the establishment of ACIRC.  
Since South Africa’s participation in peace missions is conducted through 
multilateral platforms, the research study also explored whether it would be possible 
to use the French intervention in Mali during 2013 to determine a trend from pacifist 
to robust military interventions.  It is important to clarify that exploratory studies are 
not conducted only when the area of academic enquiry is new but may also be 
carried out if the researcher is new to the subject itself or is motivated by a desire to 
satisfy personal curiosity.  The researcher in this study was motivated by the latter 
(Babbie, 2010). 
The  nature of exploratory studies means that they may also be carried out to provide 
possible grounded insight into a seemingly developing situation being developed – in 
this study the advocacy of a more robust military response to conflict resolution 
when necessary (Babbie, 2010).  Moreover, the exploratory approach allows 
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researchers to generate new ideas and makes possible assumptions of causalities (De 
Vaus, 2011).  Since the cases used in this study to determine whether South Africa 
was, indeed, learning towards a robust military approach to resolving armed 
hostilities in conflict areas included its involvement in the FIB and ACIRC, it was 
possible to formulate a hypothesis on South Africa’s future approach to peace 
missions.  It was anticipated that this hypothesis would generate possible, future 
research questions.  For example, should the research findings of this study reveal 
that there is a need to shift from a pacifist to a more robust military approach this 
would, in turn, imply that a study of how a future peacekeeping force should be 
capacitated must follow? 
3.4. DATA 
Qualitative research studies usually rely on three basic methods of gathering data, 
namely, observation; interviews and a document analysis (Nieuwenhuis & Smit, 
2012).  The data required for this research study gathered my means of a document 
analysis and interviews.  The data was collected from online sources (journals, 
reports, e-books, etc.), using the University of Witwatersrand online library platform.  
In addition, books, printed journals and reports were obtained from the University of 
Pretoria and later from the University of Duisburg-Essen as the researcher was based 
in Germany for the latter part of the study. 
A total of 15 potential interviewees were identified although 7 face to face 
interviews only were conducted.  This was mainly because the researcher had had to 
relocate to Germany during October 2016.  However, the fact that the researcher did 
not manage to conduct the other 8 interviews did not cause any major challenges 
because the interviews which were conducted were supplemented by the richly 
available secondary data on the topic under study.  All the interviews were recorded 
using a recording device and notes were also recorded in a notebook.  All the 
interviews were later transcribed into Word format for the purposes of analysis and 
interpretation. 
3.5. SAMPLING 
There are two types of sampling methods generally used in social research, namely, 
probability sampling and non-probability sampling (Babbie, 2010).  In probability 
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sampling, “everyone in the population has an equal and independent chance of being 
included on a sample” (Babbie, 2010, p.192).  On the other hand, in non-probability 
sampling, participants are included in a sample because they have been chosen, are 
available and have agreed to be involved in the study (Laher & Botha, 2012). 
This research study used the non-probability sampling method.  The non-probability 
sampling techniques used comprised purposive sampling because all the 
interviewees were carefully selected based on their knowledge of the subject under 
study.  Moreover, the participants agreed to participate in the study (Laher & Botha, 
2012).  Some of the interviewees further suggested other expects to the researcher 
and these experts also participated in the study.  In other words, the snowballing 
sampling technique was used.  The interviewees were all respected academics and 
experts with a vast knowledge of South African foreign policy and were also very 
familiar with South Africa’s participation in peace missions.  Military practitioners 
who were still active in the SANDF at the time of the study also participated in the 
study. 
3.6. INTERVIEWS 
The interviewees who had been identified and contacted and who participated in this 
research study ranged from researchers to reputable research institutions, DIRCO, 
DoD, academics and military personnel with an extensive knowledge of South 
Africa’s foreign policy as well as the country’s participation in conflict resolutions, 
particularly peace missions.  A total of 7 interviewees participated in the study 
research.  Of the 7 interviewees 5 only agreed that their names could be included in 
the final paper.  Two SANDF members chose to remain anonymous because they 
had not been able to obtain the permission of their superiors to be interviewed on 
record at the time when the interviews were conducted. 
Semi-structured, open ended interviews were used to obtain the requisite data.  An 
interview guide was prepared well in advance and adjusted according to the person 
who was to be interviewed.  For example, the questions posed was differed when 
military practitioners were being interviewed or the research expect from the 
Institute of Security Studies (ISS) was being interviewed. The semi-structured 
questions were carefully designed to arrive at the interviewee’s understanding of 
South Africa’s approach to peace missions? 
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Furthermore, the questions were aimed at helping the researcher to understand 
whether the motivation for South Africa’s participation in peace was influenced by 
either realism or idealism.  However, these questions were designed in such a way 
that answers would be obtained without any reference to either idealism or realism.  
For instance, the researcher asked a question such as “In your opinion, why do you 
think South Africa participated in peace missions or intervened in Lesotho”?  The 
participants’ answers included ‘Because South Africa did not want the conflict in 
Lesotho to spill over its borders and it wanted to secure its water interest in the Katse 
Dam’.  Some argued that such peace missions/interventions were part of South 
Africa’s international obligation as the authorities were responding to a request of 
the then president of Lesotho.  In order to analyse whether the given answer 
supported either the realist or the idealist argument, a qualitative coding method was 
developed based on the fundamentals assumptions of idealism and idealism (Babbie, 
2010). 
All the participants were informed prior to the interviews about the nature and 
purpose of the study.  They were also requested to give their consent to participate in 
the interviews and also asked for their permission to use their names on the final 
research report.  Their consent was recorded using the voice recorder before the 
interviews commenced.  They were also informed that they were free to withdraw 
from the interview for whatever reason should they feel so inclined. 
The following people and institutions were approached and agreed to participate in 
the study by granting the researcher permission to conduct the interviews: 
• Institute for Security Studies (ISS): Annette Leijenaar (Division 
Head Peace Operations and Peace Building) and Gustavo de Carvalho 
(Senior Researcher Peace Operations) were interviewed at the ISS 
offices in Pretoria on 28 September 2016. 
• Africa Institute of Southern Africa (AISA), a research arm of 
conflict resolutions, among other things, at the Human Science 
Research Council (HSRC).  DR Nicasius Check, a research specialist 
in the Governance and Security Programme, was requested to 
participate in the study and agreed to do so.  Unfortunately, the 
interview was interrupted half-way due to an emergency meeting he 
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was called to attend.  Nevertheless, sufficient data had already been 
collected. This interview also took place on 28 September 2016. 
• Defence Decision Support Institute, a Research and Development 
section at ARMSCOR: Mr L.M Mathoho is a Senior Military Analyst 
and a former senior infantry officer in the SANDF.  He was deployed 
in the Eastern DRC during the fall of Goma in 2012 as a UN military 
observer.  The interview was conducted on 27 September 2016. 
• DIRCO: Dr J.T. Pitswane, a Director at the National Office of the 
Coordination of Peace Missions at DIRCO, had agreed to an interview 
but postponed twice.  This interview did not take place. 
• Lt Col P.T Roos: A senior military officer with extensive deployment 
experience.  He is a former senior directing staff at the South African 
War College, South African Peace Mission Training Centre.  He is 
also a Master of Management (Security) graduate from the University 
of Witwatersrand.  The interview was conducted on 28 September 
2016. 
• Richard Cornwell: A research advisor in the British Peace Support 
Team South Africa and a consulted for the South African Peace 
Mission Training Centre.  He is a historian and senior researcher with 
an interest in conflict resolutions in Africa.  The interview was 
conducted on 21 September 2016 at the South African Peace Mission 
Training Centre. 
• Two senior SANDF members were also interviewed but chose to 
remain anonymous because permission to use their names at the time 
the interviews were conducted and the research report written had not 
been obtained.  Both interviews were conducted on 28 September 
2016. 
In total, seven face to face interviews were conducted and one email response 
received.  The interviews were recorded and later transcribed.  All the information 
published for the purposes of the research report was obtained legally and ethically 
and the information was disclosed with the knowledge and consent of the 
participants.  Two of the participants did not give consent for their names to be used 
in the study, although they agreed that their input be used in the research study as 
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long as their anonymity was respected.  All the interviews were conducted in 
English. 
3.7. CREDIBILITY AND TRUSTWORTHINESS OF DATA 
This research project was declared worthy of scholarly enquiry after the researcher 
had successfully defended the research proposal at a Research Proposal Board 
convened by the Faculty of Commerce, Law and Management of the University of 
Witwatersrand on 23 September 2016. 
Qualitative researchers refer to what quantitative researchers call validity and 
reliability as the credibility and trustworthiness of the data collected.  The 
trustworthiness and credibility of this data was ensured by the use of multiple 
methods of data gathering (interviews and document analysis) (Nieuwenhuis & Smit, 
2012).  In addition, the data had been gathered through the interviews was reconciled 
with the findings of a document analysis.  This research technique of validating data 
is known as the crystallisation of data.  The crystallisation of data implied that the 
researcher had compared the data gathered from the interviews and document 
analysis to ascertain whether the information was the same.  This was ensured by 
using coding methods to verify trends in the narratives of the interviews and the 
arguments put forward in the scholarly journals, books and government official 
documents consulted (Kawulich &Holland, 2012). 
3.8. LIMITATIONS OF THE RESEARCH 
This study was bounded by a few limitations.  It is important that researchers 
recognise a study’s limitations because these limitations may impact on the research 
findings.  This study did not focus on South Africa’s comprehensive approach to 
conflict resolutions and that includes soft diplomacy techniques such as mediations, 
negotiations and good offices.  Instead, the study was limited to analysing the peace 
missions in which the SANDF had been deployed as an instrument of foreign policy.  
It was unfortunate that DIRCO, particularly the National Office Coordination of 
Peace Missions, was unable to participate in the interviews.  Dr Pitswane, who is a 
director at NOCPM, had agreed to be interviewed but unfortunately it was not 
possible to set a time that would have accommodated both parties.  This limitation 
was serious because DIRCO is the custodian of South Africa’s participation in peace 
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missions and its input would have been valuable.  Nevertheless, this limitation was 
mitigated by the availability of the several documentary sources available as well as 
the other interviews which were conducted with expects on the topic. 
Finally, the researcher had relocated to Germany during the data gathering stage 
(interviews) and thus was not able to everyone potential interviewee who had been 
identified.  Nevertheless, the researcher believes that the interviews that were 
conducted provided sufficient data to enable her to proceed with the study.  In 
addition, the documentary data also compensated for the limited number of 
interviews conducted. 
3.9. ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
The researcher has ensured that all the ethical considerations required when one is 
conducting social research, as prescribed by the University of Witwatersrand’s code 
of ethics, were adhered to.  Accordingly, the researcher made sure that the neither 
the research process nor the research outcomes caused any harm to either the 
participants or those would read the final research report.  The research also 
requested the participants consent to participate in the interviews and informed them 
of the nature and purpose of the research prior to the interviews being conducted.  
Two of the participants had requested that they were not directly quoted in the 
research report because they have not obtained authorisation to participate from their 
superiors.  In addition, a declaration of honesty is also attached to this report as 
confirmation that the study is entirely the researcher’s own work and that the 
researcher has acknowledged all sources. 
3.10. TIME MANAGEMENT 
Time management is of the essence when a researcher embarks on a scholarly 
research project.  It is thus incumbent on the researcher to carefully plan for and 
allocate time for the data gathering, data analysis, and the writing of the thesis (Roos, 
2016b).  The researcher took leave from work during the period allocated to 
conducting interviews and, when necessary, to conduct research at the library.  The 
online data gathering was done after hours and over the weekends as the researcher 
was a full-time employee.  However, the analysis of the data and the writing of the 
final research report were done when the researcher was in Germany on a 
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scholarship.  This, in turn, implies that the researcher had had to juggle the writing 
the thesis while busy with the academic demands of the University of Duisburg-
Essen. 
3.11. STRUCTURE OF THE RESEARCH REPORT 
The research report was organised into six chapters as outlined below. 
• Chapter 1: Introduction and Background. This chapter included a 
discussion of the background of the study, research problem, research 
purpose, research questions as well as the research methodology and 
data collection techniques used.  Thus, this introductory chapter 
explained the background to what informed the research and the 
relevance of the study.  A brief analysis of South Africa’s foreign 
policy and its record of participation in peace missions are briefly 
explained in this chapter. 
• Chapter 2: Literature Review. The literature review chapter 
attempted to link the arguments found in the literature consulted for 
the purposes of the study with the researcher’s views on the research 
topic under study.  The literature review section also clarified the need 
to undertake this study.  It further explained important concepts and 
definitions which were of importance to the research.  The theoretical 
framework of analysis (realism and idealism) was also discussed at 
length in this chapter because this framework outlined the theoretical 
tools which were used to explore South Africa’s motivation for its 
participation in peace missions. 
• Chapter 3: Research Methodology. The chapter on research 
methodology explained the logic that was followed in conducting the 
research and outlined how the research was conducted.  The chapter 
explained the methods of data gathering and data analysis that were 
used and highlighted the challenges that were encountered during the 
research process and the compilation of the research report. 
• Chapter 4: Presentation of Research Results and Data Analysis: 
In view of the two overarching research questions, the first part of the 
research aim that addressed South Africa’s approach to peace 
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missions was addressed on this chapter.  In short, has there been a 
shift from the traditional pacifist approach to a more robust military 
approach in South Africa’s peace keeping strategy?  This question 
was based on South Africa’s participation in the FIB and its stance in 
relation to ACIRC.  The ‘Fall of Goma’ during 2012 and French 
military intervention in Mali during 2013 were used as examples.  In 
addition, the chapter also contained a section that discusses the 
possible challenges of future peace keeping.  This chapter was entitled 
‘Departure from a Pacifist to a Robust Military Approach to Peace 
Keeping’. 
• Chapter 5: Presentation of Research Results and Data Analysis. 
The second part of the research question aimed at establishing South 
Africa’s motivations for its participation in peace missions.  Could 
South Africa’s participation in peace missions be explained from a 
realist or an idealist perspective?  This chapter was entitled ‘South 
Africa’s Motivation behind Participating in Peace Missions’. 
• Chapter 6: Conclusions and recommendations. The last chapter 
contained the overall conclusions to the study and made certain 
recommendations regarding South Africa’s future approach to peace 
missions. 
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Chapter 4. ACIRC: A Departure from a Pacifist to a Robust 
Military Approach to Peace Missions? 
4.1. INTRODUCTION 
The motivation to embark on this study was influenced by two related, but separate, 
events that marked what appeared to signify a departure from the UN pacifist 
approach to peace missions to more robust military interventions.  The first event 
was led by South Africa but was, in fact, the SADC’s response to the M23 
occupation of Goma during November 2012.  After an 8 months long military 
offensive in North Kivu, the M23 finally defeated the FARDC and occupied Goma 
in November 2012.  This occupation of Goma took place in the presence of an 
estimated 17 000 large MONUSCO peacekeeping force in the DRC with some of the 
force based in Goma.  The occupation of Goma was preceded by the mass killing of 
unarmed non-combatants, the mass rape of women and children, and other related 
war crimes committed by both the M23 rebels and the Congolese army (Human 
Rights Watch, 2013). 
Disappointed by MONUSCO’s lack of an appropriate response to prevent a further 
decline of security in the North Kivu, the SADC decided to take over resolving the 
insecurity situation itself.  As a result, the SADC decided to establish an intervention 
force known as the Neutral Intervention Force (NIF) to confront the rebels and to 
assist the Congolese army to restore stability in the eastern DRC (Cammaert, 2013).  
The aim behind the SADC’s rationale for establishing the NIF was primarily to 
restore peace and stability, protect unarmed civilians from the scourges of war and 
protect a democratically elected government which was under attack from the rebel 
groups (Cammaert, 2013; Karlsrud, 2015).   
The second event occurred at approximately the same time as the occupation of 
Goma by the M23.  In northern Mali, secessionist groups, Islamic fundamentalists 
and terrorist groups launched a military offensive against the government of Mali.  
The rebels in Mali were prevented from overthrowing the government only when the 
French army intervened in the conflict at the request of the Malian government 
(Wing, 2016).  During the conflict an estimated 475 000 people were displaced.  It is 
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unclear how many were killed but it was reported that war crimes related abuses had 
been committed by both sides (CBCnews, 2013). 
These two events sparked debates among the policy makers responsible for the 
security architecture within the AU, AU regional blocs and the UN on whether it was 
time to consider ‘robust’ military interventions as a preferred method to restore 
peace and stability in war torn countries.  In 2013 alone the UN had authorised 
robust military intervention in the CAR, DRC and Mali and giving the peacekeepers 
a mandate to “use all necessary means to neutralise and disarm identified groups” 
and stabilise the areas to which they had been deployed (Karlsrud, 2015, p. 39). 
It was against this backdrop that South Africa proposed to the AU that there was an 
urgent need to establish ACIRC as an interim measure to intervene militarily in 
conflict ridden areas in order to prevent further security instability and, especially, to 
protect unarmed civilians and prevent the unconstitutional takeover of 
democratically elected governments (Esmenjaud, 2014). 
Empirical evidence on the way in which the UN and AU have approached peace 
missions in the CAR, DRC, Mali, South Sudan and Somalia over the four years prior 
to this study indicated a trend which suggested a departure from the pacifist to a 
more robust approach in the AU and UN peace missions and in line with the 
approach suggested by ACIRC advocates.  This chapter is therefore aimed at 
determining whether there has, indeed, been a shift from pacifist to a robust military 
approach to peace mission in Africa.  In other words, the chapter aimed to 
investigate whether the proposal to establish the ACIRC Brigade was an indication 
of a policy shift from pacifist to robust military interventions as the preferred 
mechanism to restore peace and stability in conflict areas.  The research report used 
the deployment of the FIB in the eastern DRC and the French military intervention 
in Mali as case studies to answer the research question. 
In order to determine whether there has been a shift in policy from a pacifist 
approach to peace missions to robust military intervention the researcher deemed it 
necessary to commence by explaining the existing mechanisms for conflict 
resolutions available to the AU and the establishment of the ACIRC.  In view of the 
case study approach adopted the chapter commenced with a brief background to both 
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the occupation of Goma by the M23 in November 2012 and the events that led to the 
French army intervention in Mali during January 2013.  The second part of the 
chapter analysed the APSA and explained how the AU uses this security mechanism 
for conflict resolution on the continent.  The emphasis was on the ASF which was 
supposed to have been commissioned in 2010 although, up to the time of writing this 
report, it had not yet been commissioned.  Since the ASF has failed to materialise 
thus far, the ACIRC concept has been proposed as an interim measure to fill the 
security gap left by the ASF.  In the third section, the chapter focuses on the core of 
the research question, namely, robust military intervention in Africa.  The FIB 
deployment in the DRC and the French army’s robust military intervention in Mali 
were used as case studies.  Thereafter, the research report evaluates the success and 
challenges of robust military interventions using the same case studies of the DRC 
and Mali.  The researcher argues that these cases could be used as valuable lessons 
for the ACIRC mechanism and later the ASF.  Before discussing the study’s 
findings, the chapter also discuss the future of robust military interventions before 
concluding. 
4.2. THE FALL OF GOMA AND THE FRENCH MILITARY 
INTERVENTION IN MALI 
4.2.1. The Fall of Goma during November 2012 
The M23 Movement was formed in April 2012 by former members of National 
Congress for the Defence of the People (CNDP) and led by Bosco Ntaganda 
(Piiparinen, 2016).  The CNDP had signed a peace agreement with the Congolese 
government in 2009 that had led to its integration into the Armed Forced of the 
Democratic Republic of Congo (known mainly by their French antonym, FARDC) 
(Murphy, 2016).  In March 2012 members of the dissolved CNDP staged a mutiny 
accusing the government of its slow pace in implementing some of the peace 
agreements of 2009 and complaining about both the unfair treatment of former 
CNDP soldiers who had been integrated into the FARDC and poor conditions in the 
army (Müller, 2015). 
The M23 started its military offensive against the Congolese army in April 2012 in 
North Kivu, in the eastern DRC and thus increasing insecurity in the region (Müller, 
2015).  Due to the brutality and indiscriminate attacks against both military and 
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civilian targets, many innocent people, particularly the vulnerable non-combatants, 
women, children and the elderly, lost their lives or were displaced from their homes 
(Duncan, 2013; Mathoho, 2016).  After seven months of intense fighting between the 
M23 and the FARDC, the Congolese army deployed in North Kivu finally 
succumbed to the M23 military offensive.  In November 2012 the M23 launched a 
final offensive on the outskirts of the provincial capital city of North Kivu, Goma.  
The FARDC was defeated. Many of its soldiers deserted their posts while some 
either surrendered or simply switched ranks to the M23 (Conwell, 2016).  When the 
M23 finally reached Goma, there was almost no resistance from the FARDC 
(Mathoho, 2016). 
It must be noted that that the M23 military offensive and the subsequent occupation 
of Goma happened in full view of the UN peacekeeping force, MONUSCO.  At the 
time of the M23 military offensive, MONUSCO’s military strength was estimated to 
be approximately 17 000 but, nevertheless, it made no effort to stop the M23 
occupation of Goma (Cammaert, 2013).  In addition, the M23 military offensive and 
the occupation of the several towns in North Kivu and the capital of Goma were 
accompanied by atrocities such as the summary execution of opponents, mass rape 
of women and children, forced recruitments and other related war crimes (Duncan, 
2013).  Thus, the painful reality was that MONUSCO’s presence in North Kivu had 
not been a sufficient deterrent for the M23 despite it being empowered with a 
Chapter VII UN Mandate (Cammaert, 2013). 
The fall of Goma to the M23 and the inaction on the part of MONUSCO prompted 
some of the stakeholders in the peace-making process in the DRC, most notably 
South Africa, to argue that it was perhaps time to consider a different approach that 
would be appropriate to the M23 threat and restoring stability in the eastern DRC.  
As a result South Africa played a key role in lobbying SADC Member States to 
establish the NIF that would, in turn, confront the M23 in a robust military 
intervention with the aim of restoring peace and stability in North Kivu (Cammaert, 
2013).  Simultaneously with the proposal by SADC to establish the NIF, the 
International Convention of the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR) proposed assembling a 
robust military force to monitor the border between the eastern DRC and Rwanda to 
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prevent foreign, armed groups from participating in rebel activities in north Kivu 
(Cammaert, 2013; Karlsrud, 2015) 
The UN was embarrassed by the fact that regional bodies were taking security 
initiatives upon themselves to resolve the growing insecurity in the eastern DRC due 
to the failure of MONUSCO.  Accordingly, before the SADC NIF and ICGLR 
border monitoring forces could be deployed to the eastern DRC, the UNSC passed 
Resolution 2098 that formally adopted and consolidated the two regional initiatives 
in their confronting of the M23 through robust military intervention (Sheeran & 
Case, 2014).  As a result, the FIB was established as a robust military intervention 
force operating under the command of MONUSCO.  The FIB consists of troops 
from South Africa, Malawi and Tanzania (Mutton, 2013).  In terms of UNSC 
Resolution 2098, which was passed on 28 March 2013, the FIB was authorised to 
take all necessary measures to protect civilians and UN personnel and to neutralise 
and disarm armed groups operating in the eastern DRC (Janik, 2014).  The 
deployment of the FIB brought a new dimension to UN peacekeeping as, “for the 
first time in its history, the UN had authorised an offensive combat force intended to 
neutralise and disarm an armed rebel group” (Cammaert, 2013, p. 2). 
The researcher is of the view that the deployment of the FIB as an offensive combat 
force with an offensive mandate marked a move from the usual passive, pacifist 
approach to peace missions to a more robust approach when addressing conflicts on 
the African continent (Piiparinen, 2016).  The following question then arose from 
this novel deployment of an offensive combat force, namely, Has there been a shift 
in policy approach from a pacifist to a more robust approach when resolving 
conflicts? 
The legitimacy of this question was underlined then, a few months after passing 
Resolution 2098, the UNSC authorised a similar mission in Mali, namely, the UN 
Multidimensional Integrated Stabilisation Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) which had a 
similar mandate to that of the FIB (Karlsrud, 2015).  Prior to the authorisation of 
MINUSMA, the French Army had been requested to and had agreed to intervene 
militarily in Mali in a robust military intervention against the Tuareg separatists and 
other armed groups that wanted to secede from Mali and establish an Islamic 
caliphate (Charbonneau & Sears, 2014). 
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4.2.2. French Military Intervention in Mali 
At about the same time as the occupation of Goma by the M23, the MNLA separatist 
group, the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO) and other al-
Qaeda linked jihadist in the Maghreb region, launched a military offensive in Mali 
(Karlsrud, 2015).  The MNLA were fighting for autonomy in northern Mali while 
the Islamic fundamentalist intention was to establish a caliphate.  Had it not been the 
robust military intervention by the French army, the Malian government would not 
have survived the military onslaught by the rebels and would have been overthrown 
(Boeke & Schuurman, 2015). 
The attempt by the MNLA separatists and the Islamic fundamentalists to overthrow 
the Mali government had been preceded by a military coup in March 2012 when a 
group of junior military officers had launched a successful coup against President 
Amadou Toumani Traure (Charbonneau & Sears, 2014).  The military junta, which 
called itself the National Committee for the Restoration of Democracy and State 
(French antonym, CNRDR), argued that it was taking over the government on the 
basis of President Traure’s failure to deal with the Tuareg separatists in northern 
Mali and the growing threat of the jihadists (Wing, 2016). 
With the military junta of the CNRDR at the helm of a fractured government, many 
soldiers deserted their posts while others joined the Tuareg separatists and Islamists 
operating from northern Mali.  The collapse of the state, which was exacerbated by 
the weakness of the military junta, made it became easy for the MNLA and the 
jihadists to align with al-Qaeda to seize several towns in northern Mali, including 
Gao, Timbuktu and Kidal (Wing, 2016).  With the rebel groups seizing the towns 
and what was left of the Malian army trying to stop the military offensive, almost 
500 000 thousand people were displaced, civilians whose loyalty could not be 
established by either side were executed, women raped and children forcefully 
recruited to the ranks of the fighters from both sides (CBCnews, 2013). 
By the time ECOWAS had forced the military junta to step down and the subsequent 
inauguration of an interim president, the Tuareg separatists had almost reached 
Bamako, the capital of Mali.  Had the armed rebel groups managed to seize the air 
force base in Kidal, the government in Bamako would have been overthrown in a 
matter of days (Wing, 2016).  In fact, Bamako and, by implication, the Malian 
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government were saved only when the French army and special forces intervened in 
January 2013 (Boeke & Schuurman, 2015).  The UN led mission, MINUSMA, 
which had replaced the ineffective AU mission, the African-led International 
Support Mission to Mali (AFISMA), only joined the French army in July 2013 
(Karlsrud, 2015).  By this time the French army had successfully defeated the Tuareg 
separatists and the jihadists rebels and had forced them to retreat, thus preventing the 
overthrow of the Malian government (Wing, 2016). 
The most crucial factor to consider in the case of the Malian conflict, at least for the 
purpose of this paper, is that both the AU and ECOWAS had failed to raise the an 
adequate military force required for intervention, in particular, when there had been 
an unconstitutional removal of a democratically elected government.  Article 4(h) of 
the AU Constitutive Act, as amended in 2010, commits the AU to militarily 
intervene in AU Member States if there is “serious threat to legitimate order” such as 
military coups and the replacement of democratically elected governments by armed 
dissident groups and rebel movements (Baimu & Sturman, 2003, p. 41). 
The failure by the AU to assist the Malian government signified a failure to meet its 
own regional mandate in terms of maintaining security and order.  In addition, this 
failure of the AU to intervene in Mali was a clear indication of the security gap left 
by the absence of the ASF and, hence, the need to establish the ACIRC Brigade as an 
interim measure.  It is true that ECOWAS had been instrumental in persuading the 
military junta to hand over power to a civilian led, interim government but it had, 
however, failed to provide support to the Malian government against the military 
offensive by the Tuareg separatist and jihadists terrorist groups who were attempting 
to overthrow the government.  The most embarrassing factor for the AU was that 
Mali had had to request its former colonial master to intervene (Karlsrud, 2015). 
It was against the backdrop of the M23 occupation of Goma and the French military 
intervention in Mali that South Africa and other AU Member States lobbied for the 
urgent establishment of ACIRC to fill the security gap that had been left by the ASF.  
The ACIRC mechanism is intended to be a rapid reaction force that will intervene 
militarily to deal with conflict and crises, particularly where there has been an 
unconstitutional change of power and the lives of unarmed civilians are endangered. 
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Thus, it is in line with Article 4(h) of the AU Constitutive Act (Baimu & Sturman, 
2003; Warner, 2015). 
Based on the deployment of the FIB and French army in the eastern DRC and Mali 
respectively, the following fundamental question again arose, namely, ‘Has there 
been a shift from pacifist to robust military intervention’ in peace missions in 
Africa?’.  However, before addressing this question, it was important to explain the 
security mechanism available to the AU to resolve violent conflicts Africa at the 
time of the study.  To this end, the next section discusses the establishment of the 
APSA. 
4.3. AFRICAN PEACE AND SECURITY ARCHITECTURE (APSA) 
The OAU was decommissioned in 2002 and replaced by the AU after a careful 
assessment of the former’s role in the post-colonial and post-cold war era.  The OAU 
Heads of States and Governments agreed that the organisation had become 
redundant and irrelevant in the light of the contemporary political, economic and 
social challenges facing the African continent.  It was then decided that a new 
organisation, which would be geared to confront the challenges facing Africa at that 
time and in the future, should succeed the OAU.  The AU was thus formally 
inaugurated in 2002 as Africa’s continental body (Warner, 2015).  Among the organs 
of the AU is the Peace and the Security Council (PSC) which is the organ which is 
mainly responsible for the “prevention, management and resolution of conflicts” in 
Africa (African Union, 2016, p. 50). 
Within the PSC the AU also has a collective umbrella body with five institutions 
which are collectively known as the APSA.  The APSA mechanism is responsible 
for promoting peace, security and stability in Africa and its responsibilities and core 
objectives are outlined in Article 3 of the AU Constitutive Act (African Union, 
2016).  The five institutions that comprise the APSA is the PSC, Panel of the Wise, 
Continental Early Warning System, the ASF and the Peace Fund (African Union, 
2016).  These bodies have distinct functions and objectives although, in the main, 
their combined objective is to promote peace, stability and stability on the African 
continent. 
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Since the main objective of this chapter was to establish whether there had been shift 
in policy from a pacifist to a more robust military approach to peace missions in 
Africa, the paper focused mainly on the ASF as a body which is envisaged to meet 
the collective security needs of the African continent, including to the right to 
intervene in a Member State facing in grave circumstances such as war crimes, 
genocide and crimes against humanity (Warner, 2015). 
4.3.1. African Standby Force 
Although the ASF was conceptualised in 2003 under the auspices of the APSC, its 
historical roots may be traced back to the establishment of the OAU in 1963 (Engel 
& Porto, 2014).  The founding fathers of the OAU had hoped to establish a Pan-
African army with the main objectives of guarding Africa’s territorial integrity and 
countering the recolonisation of the continent by pooling resources (Warner, 2015).  
The collective security mechanism of the Pan-African army under the OAU was 
intended to be a deterrent against external aggression, presumably from the former 
colonial masters and imperialists.  In common with the OAU, which placed great 
value on the principle of sovereignty, the Pan-African army was not supposed to 
intervene in the domestic affairs of member states and to hold the principles of “non-
intervention and nonaggression” in respect of member states (Warner, 2015, p. 57). 
The end of the cold war brought about different and dynamic changes in the political 
and security environment in Africa.  The OAU Heads of states and Governments 
realised that the continental body had become obsolete and, therefore, the AU 
needed to be reformed and reorganised to deal with the political, social and 
economic challenges of the post-cold war era.  Accordingly, after a series of 
meetings and summits discussing the future of the OAU, the AU was finally 
dissolved in 2002 and replaced by the AU.  The transition from the OAU to the AU 
was also accompanied by changes to the security framework. 
It was thus agreed in 2003 that the AU should establish a continental standby force 
which would be based in the five regional blocks of the AU.  The ASF comprises 
five regional brigades in alignment with the AU five regional blocks and, therefore, 
there is the Southern Africa Standby Force, ECOWAS Standby Force, East Africa 
Standby Force, Central Africa Standby Force and North African Region Standby 
Force (African Union, 2016). 
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The ASF is envisaged to provide the AU with a continental Rapid Deployment 
Capability (RDC) which could be deployed to conflict areas within fourteen days 
when requested to do so (Warner, 2015).  The other tasks of the ASF are to 
“conduct, observe, and monitor” peace missions and support functions (Warner, 
2015, p. 59).  In addition, the ASF is also responsible for the prevention of disputes 
and conflicts and for providing humanitarian assistance.  The ASF has the right to 
intervene militarily in grave circumstance at the request of the AU Member States.  
However, as a departure from its predecessor, the PSC reserves the right to intervene 
even if there has been no request from the AU Member State if there are special 
circumstances such as crimes against humanity and war crimes (African Union, 
2016). 
The ASF was supposed to have been fully operational by 2010 but, thus far, this has 
not materialised.  The 2010 deadline was then moved to 2013 and then to 2015.  
However, up until the time of writing this report it was yet to be commissioned 
(African Union, 2016).  The reasons attributed to the delay range from the lack of 
adequate resources to funding issues.  In addition, other regions such as the Central 
and North African regions have shown little interest in playing their part to ensure 
the commissioning of the ASF.  The Southern, Western and Eastern Africa are the 
only regions which have, thus far, demonstrated their willingness to commission the 
ASF and have participated in the ASF exercises, namely, AMANI AFRICA I and II 
(Institute for Security Studies, 2015; Warner, 2015). 
The failure by the AU and its regional blocks to commission the ASF by the targeted 
dates has left a security vacuum on the continent.  Both the number of civil wars and 
the character of conflict in Africa, which targets mainly non-combatants, are proof 
that the AU must accelerate the process of commissioning the ASF.  The M23 
occupation of Goma, the French army intervention in Mali and the ongoing crises in 
Burundi, DRC, CAR and South Sudan all indicate that it is vital that the AU do all it 
can to avoid another genocide such as the one seen in Rwanda and the complete 
collapse of the state as witnessed in Somalia.  Moreover, the M23 occupation of 
Goma and the Mali conflict in 2013 are clear signs that the AU cannot afford to 
continue to rely on international partners to resolve internal conflict on the African 
continent. 
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It is the view of this researcher that, had the ASF been fully functional as had been 
envisaged, the Mali and Goma incidences may have been avoided.  Moreover, a fully 
functional and unbiased ASF, under the auspices of the PSC, would serve as a 
deterrent not only to armed groups on the continent, but also to incumbent 
governments that suppress democratic progress in their countries such as in Burundi 
and the DRC.  It is as a result of the security gap left by the ASF that the AU 
Commission proposed the ACIRC concept in 2013 and operationalised it in January 
2014 as an interim measure to address security issues on the continent (Esmenjaud, 
2014).  
4.3.2. The African Capacity for Immediate Response to Conflict 
Rationale for the ACIRC Mechanism 
It was not the intention of this research report to assess the suitability of ACIRC nor 
to compare it with the ASF regional brigades but, instead, to establish whether, 
indeed, there has been a policy shift from pacifist to robust military interventions 
when resolving violent conflicts in Africa.  The paper, therefore, investigated 
whether South Africa, as the main advocate of the ACIRC concept, was indicating 
that there should be a shift in approach to peace mission from a pacifist to a robust 
military approach (Cocodia, 2016). 
As mentioned in the introductory chapter of the research report, the notion of the 
urgent establishment of ACIRC was sparked by the AU and UN failure to adequately 
resolve the declining security situation and the increasing political instability in the 
eastern DRC and Mali during 2012 (Cammaert, 2013; Esmenjaud, 2014).  After 
some intensive lobbying by the South African delegation to the AU, the ACIRC 
concept was formally proposed to the AU Commission by the then AU Chairperson, 
Dr Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, during April 2013 (De Carvalho, 2016; Warner, 
2015). 
Apart from the M23 occupation of Goma in November 2012, the AU also had to 
come to terms with the reality that it was not capable of resolving the political and 
security developments in Mali.  While the AU was still trying to decide what to do to 
restore peace in the eastern DRC, the Tuareg separatists and Islamic fundamentalists 
were intensifying their efforts to topple the Malian government.  The Tuareg 
Precious Pakamile Hlungwani 775032 
 
54 
separatists and the Islamic fundamentalists were prevented from doing so only by the 
intervention of the French army in January 2013 (Boeke & Schuurman, 2015; 
Cristiani & Fabiani, 2013).  Had it not been for the intervention of the French army, 
the AU would have had to stand by and witness the collapse of the Malian state and, 
perhaps worse, the succession of northern Mali and the establishment of an Islamic 
caliphate in one of its Member States. 
What made matters worse for the AU was that both the M23 occupation of Goma 
and the Malian crises had demonstrated to the AU that, as a regional body, it was 
incapable of maintaining peace and stability in the region; and that the notion of the 
‘African solutions to African problems’ was just a delusion (Esmenjaud, 2014).  In 
addition, it was also a demonstration that it is not possible for the AU to continue to 
rely on external actors for rapid intervention within its member states as had 
happened when the French army had come to the AU’s rescue in both Mali and the 
CAR in 2013 (Brosig & Sempijja, 2015). 
These two events indicated to some in the AU and, especially, to the SADC, 
ECOWAS and the ICGLR regional communities, that, if the AU was serious about 
realising the ideal of ‘African solutions to African problems’, then the AU could not 
continue to rely on its international partners to continue to come to its rescue it 
during security crises (Nathan & others, 2013).  Another painful reality was the 
reaffirmation that, if the AU were to make progress, it could not continue to go back 
to the former colonial masters to resolve Africa’s political and security problems as 
had happened in Mali (Warner, 2015).  The moment was, therefore, ripe for the AU 
to take decisive actions to resolve the issues of security and instability and confront 
any group that threatened peace, militarily if necessary. 
The fall of Goma and the French intervention in Mali both clearly indicated the 
existence of the security gap left by the failure to fully operationalise the ASF.  After 
the AU Commission’s proposal to establish ACIRC, other similar events that 
justified the decision to urgently establish the ACIRC took place.  For example, at 
the time of the study there was ongoing insecurity and political instability in the 
CAR, reports of ethnic cleansing in South Sudan while President Nkurunziza was 
unleashing violence against those protesting against his decision to run for a third 
term of office as president of Burundi.  In addition, in December 2016, Yahya 
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Jammeh had refused to hand over presidential power after he had lost democratic 
election in the Gambia and was forced out only when he was threatened with 
military intervention by ECOMOG.  These are just some of the few examples that 
justify the urgent need to fully capacitate the ASF and, in the interim, the ACIRC 
mechanism.  
It is important to keep in mind that the AU and its Member States have made a 
commitment to promote and consolidate democracy on the continent.  Moreover, one 
of the main objectives of the AU is the maintenance of peace and stability in Africa.  
The AU’s commitment and objectives will be realised by the protection of 
democratically elected governments against unconstitutional takeovers of power and 
the protection of unarmed civilians against the tyranny of armed groups (state or 
non-state).  In addition to the diplomatic measures as instruments with which to 
achieve the aforementioned commitment and objectives, the AU has agreed that 
military interventions will be utilised when necessary, especially in grave 
circumstances (African Union, 2016). 
The ACIRC Mechanism 
One of the instruments available to the AU to maintain and consolidate security and 
political stability on the continent is the APSA, of which the envisaged ASF and its 
subsidiary, the RDC unit, are intended to intervene militarily should there be a threat 
to political security and instability in the region.  As the time of writing this report, 
the commissioning of the ASF had been postponed four times – in 2008, 2010, 2013 
and 2015 (Cocodia, 2016).  Although it is not clear when the ASF will finally come 
to fruition as was intended, its absence has, however, left a security gap within the 
APSA.  The delay in commissioning the ASF is denying the APSC the ability to 
deploy a peacekeeping force in grave circumstances as defined in Article 13 of the 
PSC Protocol (African Union, 2016, p. 58). 
It is against this backdrop that the ACIRC concept was proposed as an interim 
solution to fill the gap left by the ASF (Warner, 2015).  The ACIRC was, therefore, 
an interim measure as a result of the delay in fully commissioning the ASF.  The 
main purpose of the ACIRC is to provide the AU with a “flexible and robust force, 
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voluntarily provided by Member States, to effectively respond to emergency 
situations” within the APSA framework (African Union, 2016, p. 60) 
The ACIRC force will be deployed in the following circumstances: “ (i) stabilisation, 
peace enforcement and intervention missions, (ii) neutralisation of terrorist groups, 
other cross-border criminal entities, armed rebellions; and (iii) emergency assistance 
to Member States within the framework of the principles of non-indifference to the 
protection of civilians” (de Albuquerque, 2016, p. 20) 
It is planned that the ACIRC Brigade will comprise 5000 troops deployed 
voluntarily by the AU Member States.  Of the 5000 troops, it should be possible to 
deploy 1500 to the theatre of conflict within 10 days and that they should be able to 
sustain themselves for 30 days on the front before the rest of the force arrives to 
reinforce them (Esmenjaud, 2014).  Thus, the composition of ACIRC is that of an 
offensive force prepared to engage directly with the spoilers of peace in a military 
combat.  The ACIRC force will be both small, flexible and quickly mobilised for the 
purposes of deployment (Cocodia, 2016).  It consists of the following elements: 
Three tactical battle groups, comprised of three infantry battalions of 850 
troops each, an artillery support group and light armour elements, as well as 
the air wing of 400 troops, which will include strike aircraft and helicopters 
and logistical support, including strategic airlift capabilities.  The unit 
would have a 10-day notice of movement (Warner, 2015, p. 60). 
Whether this composition is too ambitious or not, the envisaged ACIRC Brigade has 
all the characteristics of an offensive force.  The ACIRC concept provides the AU 
with a conflict resolution mechanism to enable it to confront armed groups head-on 
and achieve what the FIB achieved in the eastern DRC in supressing the M23 armed 
rebellion and what the French army achieved in routing the Tuareg separatists and 
Islamic fundamentalists in Mali.  In other words, the ACIRC mechanism provides 
the AU with the capability to robustly confront armed elements with the aim of 
ending hostilities and returning to the negotiating table (Esmenjaud, 2014).  
However, most importantly, it is aimed at protecting the innocent civilians who often 
suffer the most during violent conflicts; and promoting democracy by preventing the 
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unconstitutional change of governments through undemocratic means (African 
Union, 2016). 
Contrary to the ASF which implies the deployment to conflict areas of organised and 
staffed regional brigades, the ACIRC concept proposes that the ACIRC Brigades 
could be pledged by a group of AU Member States or even be from one country 
(Esmenjaud, 2014).  In other words, ACIRC deployment will be composed of a 
“coalition of the willing” who will decide on the number of troops, equipment and 
funding to assist in conflict areas (Conwell, 2016; Warner, 2015).  This ACIRC 
brigade must also be willing and able to sustain itself while deployed in relation to 
both logistics and funding (Brosig & Sempijja, 2015). 
At the time of writing this report 13 of the 54 AU Member States only had pledged 
forces to the ACIRC, namely, “Algeria, Angola, Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, 
Chad, Egypt, Niger, Rwanda, Senegal, South Africa, Sudan and Uganda” (African 
Union, 2016, p. 60).  It must be noted that some countries, most notably, Nigeria, 
Kenya and Ethiopia, have vigorously opposed the ACIRC concept, arguing that the 
AU should, instead, focus on resourcing the ASF because this new initiative will 
only lead to the redirection of resources which were intended for the ASF, thus 
leading to a further delay in commissioning the ASF (Cocodia, 2016; Warner, 2015) 
It is worth to noting that, despite the fact that the ACIRC concept appears to be 
similar to that of the ASF, their main objectives are fundamentally different and, 
hence, the scepticism from some AU Member States.  For example, the ASF’s six 
deployment scenarios are in line with the UN peace mission spectrum which ranges 
from conflict prevention to peacebuilding.  For the ASF, Chapter VII of the UN 
Charter (peace enforcement) will be invoked only in grave circumstances such as 
“war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide” (Esmenjaud, 2014, p. 174). 
On the other hand, in addition to the deployments under grave circumstances in line 
with Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the ACIRC concept makes further provision for 
the deployment of the ACIRC Brigade in cases of non-indifference towards the 
protection of civilians, neutralisation of terrorist groups, cross-border criminal 
entities and armed rebellions (Esmenjaud, 2014; Warner, 2015).  In short, the 
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ACIRC concept is envisaged to robustly engage the ‘enemies of peace’ by 
confronting them militarily and is beyond the scope of the ASF. 
The advocates of the ACIRC concepts argue that the departure from a pacifist to a 
more robust approach to peace mission is justified based on the failure of the existing 
mechanisms, for example, the failure to prevent the occupation of Goma and the near 
capture of Bamako in 2012 and 2013 respectively (Esmenjaud, 2014).  As 
demonstrated in the next sections, it was due to their willingness to confront the 
rebels, separatists and jihadists groups in armed combat that the FIB and the French 
army were successful in routing these groups which were threatening peace in the 
DRC and Mali respectively. 
Although the ACIRC mechanism appeared to be the most viable option in respect of 
intervention in conflict areas, it has certain serious weaknesses that are impossible to 
ignore. The most notable weakness in the ACIRC framework is that it may only be 
deployed when requested to do so by a Member State and as authorised by the PSC.  
This is problematic because it seems to be in line with the outdated principle of non-
intervention in Member States.  No Member State that would request the 
intervention of ACIRC’s rapid deployment force against itself but only if the regime 
were under attack. 
Such an instance was the refusal of the Burundian government in January 2016 to 
accept the AU deployment of a peacekeeping force during the protests against 
President Nkurunziza’s intention to run for office despite the fact that his 
constitutional term of office had expired.   Nkurunziza’s regime responded to these 
protests by intimidating and killing the protesters.  In this situation, the AU should 
have deployed a peacekeeping force to protect the innocent and unarmed protesters 
against the Burundian security forces.  However, when the AU resolved to send a 
peacekeeping force to Burundi the government threatened the AU that it would treat 
the deployment as an infringement of its sovereignty and that it would respond by 
treating the AU peacekeeping force as an enemy of Burundi, thus reserving the right 
to defend itself (De Carvallo, 2016; Leijenaar, 2016) . 
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4.4. ROBUST MILITARY INTERVENTIONS IN THE EASTERN DRC 
AND MALI 
4.4.1. The FIB Robust Military Intervention in the DRC 
The M23 reached Goma in November 2012 despite the presence of a 17 000 strong 
force of MONUSCO.  SADC, led by South Africa and Tanzania, proposed the 
formation of a NIF to intervene in Goma on humanitarian grounds and to oppose the 
attack on a legitimate and democratically elected government (Karlsrud, 2015; 
Müller, 2015).  In line with the SADC’s NIF initiative, the ICGLR also proposed the 
establishment of another regional mission to control the border between the DRC 
and Rwanda (Müller, 2015).  Both SADC and the ICGLR intended to address the 
security situation in the DRC themselves as MONUSCO was doing very little to 
save the situation.  Thus, the regional bodies argued that they would not stand and 
watch while the security situation continued to deteriorate (Cammaert, 2013).  One 
may argue that the initiative on the part of SADC and the ICGLR to restore peace 
and stability in the eastern DRC was informed by the intention to prevent another 
Rwanda where innocent civilians were massacred in the presence of the UN 
peacekeeping force (Mathoho, 2016). 
MONUSCO was heavily criticised by the international community and, particularly 
by AU Member States, for allowing the M23 to occupy Goma and for the resultant 
humanitarian disaster in the aftermath of the M23’s onslaught on unarmed non-
combatants (de Carvallo, 2016).  As a result of its embarrassment and the wish to 
prevent the regional blocs from establishing missions parallel with MONUSCO, the 
UNSC passed Resolution 2076 on 20 November 2012, expressing its concern 
regarding the deteriorating security situation in the eastern DRC and the deepening 
humanitarian situation due to the activities of the M23 (Müller, 2015).  Resolution 
2076 gave the UN Secretary General the mandate to explore options to improve the 
mandate of MONUSCO regarding resolving the deteriorating insecurity situation. 
The UN Secretary General decided to the intentions of SADC and ICGLR into line 
in order to strengthen MONUSCO and give it a fresh mandate with the power to 
confront the M23 militarily.  It was then agreed that the military forces that were to 
be deployed by SADC and ICGLR to the DRC must be integrated into MONUSCO 
and their actions aligned through the unity of command provided by the UN 
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peacekeeping force already active in the DRC.  As such, on 28 March 2013 the 
UNSC passed Resolution 2098 authorising the deployment of the FIB (Müller, 
2015).  Resolution 2098 authorised the FIB to “neutralise armed groups and to 
reduce the threat posed by armed groups to state authority and civilian security 
through targeted offensive operations in a robust, highly mobile and versatile 
manner” (The Permanent Mission of Germany to the UN, 2014, p. 1). 
By November 2013, seven months after the deployment of the FIB, the M23 was 
defeated as a military force (Müller, 2015).  The FIB had proved itself to be a 
credible intervention force that had been able to neutralise the military threat posed 
by the M23 and other armed groups operating in North Kivu.  After suffering heavy 
military defeats, the M23 agreed to return to the negotiating table in August 2013.  
By this time the M23 had lost its leverage as many of its fighters had been killed in 
combat, fled for neighbouring countries or simply integrated in the local 
communities (Murphy, 2016). 
The deployment of the FIB in the eastern DRC was similar to the intended 
achievements of ACIRC and the ASF under Scenario 6 (Cilliers, 2008).  In light of 
the military success of the FIB against the M23, one may argue that the ACIRC 
concept and/or the ASF will be a valuable addition to the APSA as, not only hade the 
FIB defeat the M23 militarily but it had also forced them to return to the negotiating 
table. 
Moreover, the FIB success saved the lives of vulnerable people in the DRC, 
particularly women, children and elderly people (Duncan, 2013).  Although, in the 
main, insecurity still prevail in the eastern DRC the FIB has, nevertheless, achieved 
the majority of its mandated objectives.  The M23 as a credible fighting force has 
disappeared while, similar to the military successes of the FIB against the M23, the 
French army also managed to prevent the overthrow of the government of Mali in 
2013. 
4.4.2. French Military Intervention in Mali 
In common with many conflicts on the African continent, the 2012 conflict in Mali 
may be traced back to 1960 when the country gained its independence from France.  
Throughout the post-colonial era in Mali, the main causes of the conflict may be 
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narrowed down to poor governance of the state, economic mismanagement and 
underdevelopment (Charbonneau & Sears, 2014).  In addition, the nature of the 
Malian conflicts, in most cases, has taken on an ethnic and racial dimension between 
the Arabs, based mainly in the northern parts of the country, and the ‘black 
Africans’, based mainly in the southern part of Mali. 
The 2012 conflict was not different to previous causes of conflicts as the government 
of President Amadou Toumani Traure was accused of mismanaging the economy, 
failed state institutions and endemic corruption (Boeke & Schuurman, 2015).  As a 
result, a newly formed political party, MNLA, formed by those returning from the 
Libyan conflict embarked on a mission to demand an autonomous state in northern 
Mali (Boeke & Schuurman, 2015).  As a result of the government’s inability to deal 
with the MNLA separatists in northern Mali, a group of officers led by Captain 
Amadou Sonogo successfully deposed the government in a bloodless military coup 
in March 2012 (Wing, 2016).  The military junta justified the military coup, claiming 
that, as compared to the government, they would be in a better position to address 
the insecurity situation caused by the military offensive in the north and restore order 
and political stability in Mali. 
With the fractured military junta led by junior officers and a depleted army(some of 
the Malian troops defected to the ranks of the Tuareg separatists and other Islamic 
fundamentalists), the insurgents were able to seize many cities in northern Mali, 
including Gao, Timbuktu and Kidal (Wing, 2016).  By the time the military junta 
had been forced to step down by the AU and ECOWAS, the Tuareg separatists had 
almost reached Bamako, the capital of Mali.  When the interim government led by 
President Dioncouda Traore was inaugurated, the rebels were on the verge of seizing 
the town of Konna on the boundary between northern and southern Mali.  Writers 
such as Wing (2016) argue that, had the rebels succeeded in taking over the air force 
base in Konna, Bamako would have fallen in a matter of days. 
The interim president was under pressure to quell the rebel advances to Bamako.  
With no adequate military assistance from ECOWAS and the AU, President 
Dioncouda Traore was left with no choice but to ask France, Mali’s former colonial 
master, for military assistance.  The French government acceded to the request of the 
government of Mali and, on 11 July 2013, the French army intervened in the Malian 
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conflict (Boeke & Schuurman, 2015; Wing, 2016).  At the peak of its  deployment in 
Mali, the military strength of the French army was approximately 5000 – the same 
number which both the ASF and ACIRC would  deploy in the theatre of conflict 
(Cocodia, 2016; Esmenjaud, 2014).  Within three weeks of the French army’s robust 
military engagement against the Tuareg separatist and Islamic fundamentalist 
groups, the French army had succeeded in halting the rebel advances to Bamako 
(Boeke & Schuurman, 2015). 
In line with the robust military intervention which had succeeded in defeating the 
M23 militarily, the French army also managed to defeat both the Tuareg separatist 
and Islamic fundamentalist groups in armed combat.  The majority of the insurgents 
were  killed, some fled to neighbouring Chad and Libya while some integrated 
themselves into the civilian population in Mali (Boeke & Schuurman, 2015).  By the 
time the AFSMA had been integrated into a UN led mission MINUSMA, on 1 July 
2013, the French had already defeated the insurgents (Cocodia, 2016).  MINUSMA 
was then left with the responsibility of ensuring the continued stability in northern 
Mali and which had been achieved by the French within a very short space of time. 
The robust military interventions by both the FIB and the French army demonstrated 
that a ‘robust military solution’ could be successful in ending armed hostilities.  At 
the same time, robust military interventions have also proved that they are not a 
desirable long term strategy because, despite the military defeat of the M23 in the 
DRC and the Tuareg separatists and Islamic fundamentalists in Mali, at the time of 
the study political and security instability continued to prevailed in both countries 
(Cocodia, 2016; Mathoho, 2016).  Nevertheless, in the main, military interventions 
save the lives of the innocent non-combatants who are often caught up in the midst 
of the conflict.  Although robust military intervention is a useful strategy to end 
armed hostilities quickly it is essential that the main aim of such intervention is to 
persuade the “spoilers of peace” to return/come to the negotiating table (Roos, 
2016a). 
Despite the successes of robust military intervention in terms of militarily defeating 
armed groups, as seen in the DRC and Mali, there are notable lessons to be learnt in 
relation to both the challenges and success factors.  It is no longer a matter of debate 
whether the AU should accelerate the commissioning of the ASF and integrate some 
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of the elements of the ACIRC into its operating mechanism.  However, does the 
success of robust military intervention in the cases cited above provide evidence that 
such robust military interventions are the future of peace missions in Africa? 
4.5. SUCCESSES AND CHALLENGES OF ROBUST MILITARY 
INTERVENTION IN THE DRC AND MALI 
It was necessary to interrogate the reasons why the robust military interventions were 
successful in the eastern DRC and Mali.  Despite the acknowledgement at the end of 
this the research study that robust military interventions are not a sustainable option 
in the interests of long-term peace, they do, nevertheless, remain a key strategy that 
may be used as an interim measure while other diplomatic measures are being 
explored as intended by the ASF and ACIRC.  The lessons learnt from the successful 
French army and FIB interventions may be important in terms of other robust 
military engagement in future peacekeeping in Africa. 
Success of the Robust Military Interventions in the eastern DRC and Mali 
The first success factor in relation to robust military intervention and, perhaps, the 
most important reason for such interventions, is the growing recognition on the part 
of the AU Member States that insecurity and political instability may impact 
adversely on political and economic progress.  If the AU Member States are not 
willing to resolve political instability and violent conflicts then the developmental 
progress of the continent will continue to lag behind that of other regions in the 
world.  It may thus be said that the success of the FIB was primarily because the AU 
Member States in the regional blocs demonstrated their willingness to take matters 
into their own hands to resolve conflict even if this meant going to war in order to 
restore peace (Karlsrud, 2015). 
SADC and the ICGLR initiated the FIB and were prepared to take the risk to restore 
peace in the region.  This same willingness was also shown by ECOWAS in Mali 
despite the delay in sending ECOMOG to restore peace in Mali.  In other words, if 
the regional blocs are prepared not only to show solidarity but also to take active 
steps to resolve conflict this sends a clear message to the aspiring armed combatants 
that they will have to resolve their political disputes through peace means because 
violence will no longer be tolerated. 
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Regarding the willingness of the regional blocs to confront armed groups in armed 
combat, the FIB was used and the Malian conflict resolved by the coalition of states 
which were willing to risk their citizens to resolve the escalating humanitarian 
disasters in the DRC and Mali.  Despite the fact that the motives of the ‘coalition of 
the willing’ have been criticised as the “willing” pursuing the narrow interests of 
their own countries in the DRC and Mali, it is clear that, in order to deploy a robust 
military army, the AU will have rely on the willingness of its Member States to take 
risks by sending their countrymen on high risk peace missions (De Carvallo, 2016). 
Military operations are expensive and, particularly, for the offensive combat forces.  
The offensive military operations in the eastern DRC and Mali were funded by the 
UN and the French government respectively.  The advantage of the robust military 
offensive in Mali was the logistics support afforded to the French army.  Unlike the 
rebel forces in Mali, the French army was provided with all the logistical support it 
needed on a daily basis (Wing, 2016).  The FIB, which operates under the auspices 
of MONUSCO is also equally well resourced.  The approved budget for the period 
June 2016 to June 2017 is $1 235 723 100 (United Nations General Assembly, 2016, 
p. 3).  Thus, both the French army and the FIB are well resourced in terms of troops, 
equipment and funding.  Thus, the lesson to be learnt is that, if the ACIRC offensive 
military operations are to be a success, it is essential that the issues of funding, 
logistical support and other related military requirements are taken seriously.  
However, the proposed funding model in terms of which the member states must 
self-fund their military operations will, in all likelihood, deter poor countries from 
participating because they will not be able to afford to fund their military operations 
even if they are willing to send troops on the missions. 
On the operational and tactical levels, several factors contributed to the success of 
the French military intervention in Mali and the FIB in the DRC.  The air power of 
both the FIB and French army was superior to that of the armed groups against 
which they were fighting.  The FIB air superiority was provided by the South 
African Air Force attack helicopter gunship, the Rooivalk (Roos, 2016a) while the 
French army ‘Operation Serval’ was backed by superior air power capable of both 
attack and surveillance (Boeke & Schuurman, 2015).  Thus, the lesson to be learnt 
for both ACIRC and the ASF is that air superiority plays an important role in the 
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success of offensive military combat.  Since ACIRC is intended to be a ‘coalition of 
the willing’ this implies that countries that volunteer for a specific intervention must 
ensure that their military strengths complement each other and they must ensure that 
they have air superiority over the armed group with which they are engaging. 
Another success factor at the tactical level was that, in Mali, the French army had 
sound tactical intelligence and combat experience and there was limited media 
coverage.  The French government has always had strategic interests in Mali due to 
the uranium mines that supply the French energy generating sector and, therefore, 
France always takes a keen interest in political developments that may impact 
negatively on its national interests.  Moreover, the French intelligence had always 
kept a close eye on Islamic fundamentalists whom, they believe, may attempt to 
launch terrorist attack in France and then retreat to their base in Mali.  Accordingly, 
the French have always gathered intelligence on developments in Mali.  The 
intelligence which the French army had at its disposal was instrumental in assisting 
them to identify the key instigators who had to be eliminated and/or isolated.  The 
intelligence was also important in helping the French army to navigate the 
topography of the area with ease  (Wing, 2016). 
The lesson to be learnt in this instance is that intelligence gathering is crucial in 
winning combat engagement against any ‘enemy’.  In the context of the ASF and 
ACIRC, the researcher acknowledges that intelligence gathering by one member 
state over the other is a very sensitive matter.  However, if the AU and its regional 
blocs and member states are serious about continental and regional collective 
security, they must understand that they would have to let go of their sovereignty in 
intelligence gathering.  In other words, the AU and its Member States must come up 
with a strategy for intelligence gathering and intelligence sharing, especially in areas 
identified by its Early Warning Systems (De Carvallo, 2016). 
In addition, the French army also had combat experience as some of its soldiers had 
gained combat experience during their assignments in Afghanistan and Iraq.  This 
combat experience, in turn, was invaluable in their fighting against seasoned fighters 
who had just fought in Libya (Wing, 2016).  This paper is not suggesting that 
ACIRC troops must have combat experience but does suggest regular joint military 
exercises, such as the AMANI AFRICA I and II, to prepare themselves for armed 
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combat (African Union, 2016).  The AU will then have to find the financial and 
other resources necessary to continue to fund the joint military exercises to prepare 
the ASF and ACIRC Brigade for armed combat. 
Challenges for the ACIRC Concept 
The ACIRC concept appears be a desirable, quick solution for resolving conflict in 
Africa.  However, despite the laudable objectives of the ACIRC, like the ASF, there 
are, nevertheless, numerous challenges and, hence, the delay in its commissioning 
and the possibility that the ACIRC concept is destined for the same fate as the ASF.  
The ACIRC concept faces challenges including logistics, funding, capacity and 
numerous others.  This paper, however, limited its discussion on these challenges to 
political issues regarding troop contribution and the legal principles of peacekeeping. 
It is envisaged that the ACIRC Brigade will be composed of troops from a ‘coalition 
of the willing’ AU Member States.  In addition, ACIRC aims to be able to mobilise 
1500 troops for a rapid response in conflict areas within a period of 10 to 15 days 
while the remaining 3500 troops will reinforce the advance team within 30 days.  It 
has already been mentioned in this paper that, at the time of this study, 13 of the 54 
AU Member States only had pledged forces for the ACIRC. 
Should the PSC authorise the deployment of ACIRC, it is highly improbable that the 
ACIRC will be able to mobilise the number of required troops within the stipulated 
time period.  For example, the majority of the Member States which have pledged 
forces are already committed in other UN or AU missions and, therefore,  it is 
extremely unlikely that they would be able to mobilise more troops for another 
mission elsewhere (Leijenaar, 2016).  Moreover, the ACIRC concept is based on the 
troops of these countries bringing their own equipment and resources and being self-
funding (Cocodia, 2016).  However, many countries are already struggling to fund 
their own security and social programmes at home.  Thus, even if the countries 
supplying these troops were willing to deploy them, issues relating to airlift capacity 
and the provisioning of the troops at the front may cause domestic problems at home 
due to competing social needs which these countries are already struggling to 
address.  In other words, the AU will have to come up with a better funding and 
logistic mechanism if the ACIRC is to work. 
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The other challenge identified in this paper was the fact that peacekeeping is the 
primary responsibility of the UNSC.  At first glance the ACIRC concept appeared to 
represent a solution to conflict resolutions, especially in instances in which innocent 
civilians are caught up in the fire between warring parties.  However, the ACIRC 
concept is a clear departure from the fundamental UN principles of peacekeeping as 
they stand today.  In essence, peacekeeping rests upon two defining features: 
Firstly, from the organisational point of view, according to Article 29 of the UN 
Charter, all peace missions come under the auspices and command of the UNSC 
(Müller, 2015).  The intention of the SADC NIF and the ICGLR fell outside of the 
ambit of the UN and thus did not qualify as peace missions.  Even though Chapter 
VIII of the UN Charter does allow regional bodies to embark on peace missions 
these must still be authorised by the UNSC.  Moreover, the AU has to obtain 
authorisation from the UNSC to deploy an intervention force.  Such authorisation is 
not always guaranteed as that some permanent members in the UNSC may veto such 
decisions by the AU.  Thus, unless the AU is able to come to some sort of 
compromise with the UNSC regarding the deployment of ACIRC, it may, 
sometimes, find itself contravening bothy the international laws of peace missions 
and the UN Charter. 
Secondly, peacekeeping is based on three fundamental principles, namely, consent of 
the parties, impartiality and the non-use of force except in defence of the mandate 
(Müller, 2015).  It is true that these fundamental principles of peacekeeping have 
been revised.  For example, the consent of the parties is not required in grave 
circumstances such as genocide, crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing.  
Moreover, impartiality does not mean that the UN peacekeeping force must not act 
to prevent action on the part of the spoilers of peace.  However, it is not clear what 
the AU would do if it did not receive authorisation from the UNSC.  Would the AU 
proceed unilaterally as the USA did in Granada? (Diehl, 1994). 
Moreover, how would the AU ensure that the coalition of the willing is not 
composed only of those with vested interests?  Also, what if there is no consensus 
from the AU Member States themselves regarding deployment to the country in 
question?  If this is not clearly defined it has a potential to further escalate conflict 
because other countries may intervene to defend their allies as happened in the Great 
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Lakes Region when some members of the SADC found themselves at war fighting 
alongside the DRC government troops against Rwanda and Uganda during 1998.  It 
is thus clear that AU will have to do everything to prevent such a scenario in view of 
the potential of military solutions to cause an escalation in hostilities. 
The challenge cited by humanitarians is that robust military interventions, for 
example, those carried out by the FIB, places the fundamental principles of 
peacekeeping at risk.  It is argued that intervening in combat engagement means that 
the UN peacekeeping force will be party to conflict, thus negating some of the key 
principles of UN peacekeeping, for example, impartiality (The Permanent Mission of 
Germany to the UN, 2014).   
The FIB has achieved visible successes in the eastern DRC and French army in Mali.  
Nevertheless, on balance, it must be noted that robust military intervention comes 
with many potential challenges and, if these challenges are not anticipated and well 
managed, this could result in the further insecurity on the African continent.  
However, the challenges also do not mean there is no future for robust military 
interventions in relation to resolving violent conflict but simply that the AU will just 
have to be vigilant and not replace the peaceful settlement of conflicts with the barrel 
of a gun. 
4.6. THE FUTURE OF ROBUST MILITARY INTERVENTION 
The military success of the FIB and the French army in the DRC and Mali proved 
beyond doubt the power of robust military intervention to supress armed rebellion 
and limit the suffering of innocent civilians.  In addition, robust military intervention 
has also proved itself to be a useful instrument in the promotion and consolidation of 
democracy by protecting democratically elected governments from armed rebellion – 
as is intended with the ACIRC.  However, the consensus from both the literature 
review and the interviews conducted for the purposes of this study is that robust 
military intervention is not desirable although it may be a necessary tool for short-
term strategic gains in persuading the spoilers of peace to halt armed hostilities and 
return to the negotiating table. 
After the success of the FIB in the eastern DRC, there were calls for the same model 
to be used to be used in other conflict affected areas such as South Sudan, CAR and 
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Somalia (The Permanent Mission of Germany to the UN, 2014).  However, 
unfortunately, even if the resources were available to deploy a force such as ACIRC 
in hostile conflict environments, there are very few countries willing to risk their 
troops in such dangerous missions.  As indicated earlier in the paper, 13 AU Member 
States only have pledged their contribution to the ACIRC.  In addition, it must be 
noted that a pledge and an actual contribution are two different things.  Countries 
may pledge resources but, when the time for actual deployment comes, they are 
often not able to fulfil their pledges for several reasons.  The lack of pledges in 
respect of the ACIRC Brigade is an indication that the AU must consider other 
mechanisms or, at least, prioritise the commissioning of the ASF because it will 
operate at a regional level and could always be supplemented by other regions if 
required (Cilliers, 2008). 
The reason why the UN changed the principle of neutrality to one of impartiality was 
to allow the UN peacekeeping force a wider use of force in defence of the UN 
mandates (Muller, 2015, p. 360).  Thus, the mechanisms and principles of 
peacekeeping in place at the time of the study were sufficient to enforce peace 
without complicating the issue by additional structures such as the ACIRC.  
Deploying a force such as the FIB goes against the principle of avoiding the UN to 
be part of the conflict.  Relying on lead countries or a coalition of the willing may 
mean that the AU may run the risk of its Member States becoming involved in the 
conflict and, in the long term, this may have serious repercussions.  The principle of 
impartiality implies that the UN or AU peacekeeping force may use the necessary 
amount of force in defence of the peacekeeping mandate and thus what is required is 
leadership willing to exercise its powers as per the mandate at both the operational 
and tactical levels of peacekeeping operations. 
Moreover, deploying a unilateral army such as the French army in Mali violates the 
principles of a multilateral approach to peacekeeping.  The same may be said for the 
‘coalition of the willing’ because the AU runs the risk of its member states trying to 
pursue their own interests in other countries militarily.  For example, how would the 
AU ensure that South Africa was not pledging forces to deploy on an ACIRC 
mission in Burundi or DRC in order to safeguard its own business and mining 
interests (Roos, 2016a).  Although such concerns may be mere supposition they are, 
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however, genuine concerns which both the AU and the UN must take into 
consideration if they intend to preserve the credibility of international peacekeeping. 
Robust military intervention is not a sustainable solution because it is not possible 
for either the AU or the UN guarantee that their member states will be willing to 
participate in high risk missions such as the FIB and the mission undertaken by the 
French armed forces in Mali (Mathoho, 2016).  Thus, although the political will to 
use robust force is vital for peace enforcement missions it may not be a strategy 
which the AU and the UN should adopt.  
There is a danger should the AU and UN wish to continue with robust military 
intervention such as the FIB and the intervention by the French armed forces.  
France did not necessarily intervene in Mali in order to protect the Malian 
government and its populace and, instead, its intervention was driven primarily by its 
own strategic interests of denying the Islamic fundamentalists and terrorists groups 
aligned to al-Qaida a base from which to operate.  In addition, Mali supplies over 30 
per cent of France’s uranium needs for its energy generating capacity and, hence, the 
French’s wish to ensure continued political and security stability in Mali (Wing, 
2016).  Similarly, in respect of the FIB, South Africa is the largest contributor of 
both personnel and military equipment.  In addition, South Africa has vast business 
interests in the retail, banking and mining sectors in the DRC (Roos, 2016b).  With 
such vested interests on the part of the countries volunteering, it is difficult to argue 
that their participation is not driven by their own national interest but by altruistic 
motives. 
This paper, therefore, argues that, despite empirical evidence from 2012 which 
suggests growing trend in the UN authorisation of ‘robust military intervention’, 
such a strategy is a short term solution only.  In terms of the African continent level, 
the AU must ensure that the APSA structures works in harmony to ensure that 
conflict is managed before it escalates to violance.  The researcher supports the 
continued efforts to commission the ASF and the ACIRC in the interim process.  The 
ASF should be available to the AU to be deployed in all six of the scenarios 
identified so that the spoilers of peace are aware that, if they are not willing to 
achieve peace through dialogue, the AU will not stand aside and watch them punish 
innocent civilians in their quest to realise their political agendas. 
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4.7. IS THERE A SHIFT FROM A PACIFIST TO A ROBUST 
MILITARY APPROACH? 
The first research question aimed at determining whether, from South Africa’s point 
of view, there has been a shift from a pacifist to a robust military approach to 
peacekeeping.  This question emanated from South Africa’s insistence that the 
ACIRC be established in the interim while the ASF has not yet been commissioned.  
The study used the FIB and the French army intervention in Mali as case studies that 
could be generalised to answer the primary research question addressed in this 
chapter.  Having evaluated the motivation for the establishment of the ACIRC, the 
deployment of the FIB in the eastern DRC and the French army’s intervention in 
Mali, the next section discusses the study’s finding in relation to the research 
question posed. 
The period between 2013 and 2016 has seen the UNSC authorise four robust military 
interventions in Africa.  In 2013 the UNSC passed Resolution 2098 to authorise the 
deployment of the FIB in the DRC (Cammaert, 2013).  In April 2013 the UNSC 
authorised the deployment of the MINUSMA in Mali with this replacing the AU led 
mission (Boeke & Schuurman, 2015).  The French army’s robust intervention in 
Mali, which was a precursor to MINUSMA, had the sanction of the UN.  In 2014 the 
UNSC also authorised robust military intervention in both the CAR and South 
Sudan.  Thus, the empirical evidence from the previous three years suggests that the 
UNSC is more prepared to authorise peace missions which are ‘robust’ in approach 
than before.  As already indicated, this research study attempted to answer the 
following research, namely, has there been in change in policy from a pacifist to a 
robust military approach to peacekeeping? 
It was no easy task to answer this question because, despite the empirical evidence 
indicating that there has, indeed, been a shift in approach from a pacifist to robust 
military approach, both the UN and the AU are quick to point out that the preferred 
method of conflict resolutions is a peaceful approach which favours dialogue 
between the warring parties.  Thus, robust military interventions are authorised as a 
last resort only. 
Robust military interventions are authorised only in exceptional circumstances and 
are also used only at a tactical level to halt armed hostilities.  In other words, robust 
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military interventions should be used in an effort to achieve long term peace by 
creating the necessary conditions for the warring parties to go to the negotiating table 
and resolve their differences without further escalation of violance (Leijenaar, 2016). 
Legally there has been no change in approach because the existing UN conflict 
resolution mechanisms and principles of peacekeeping do allow for robust 
peacekeeping without the UN Charter having to be amended (Murphy, 2016).  The 
UN Charter makes provision for the UNSC and the regional bodies to conduct 
‘robust’ military intervention when they are so authorised through the UNSC.  The 
‘robust’ intervention simply refers to the operational tern used by the UN to 
communicate the message that it is going to use the necessary proportional force to 
deter armed groups (Murphy, 2016).  Robust military intervention is allowed under 
Chapters VI, VII and VIII of the UN Charter.  For example, a peacekeeping force is 
given a specific mandate only after the threat level has been determined.  Thus, the 
threat level and the security instability in the theatre of operations will determine 
whether the UN peacekeeping force and, by extension, the AU will be deployed 
under Chapter VI or VII (Mathoho, 2016).  It is important to note that, in all peace 
missions, be it under Chapter VI or VII, the principles of peace missions still apply 
and peacekeepers should be trained to understand how they must act within the 
confines of the principles of peace missions (Mathoho, 2016). 
The data gathered from both the literature review and the interviews supports the 
view that that there had been an increase in the authorisation of robust military 
intervention in the four years prior to the study.  However, despite this increase, the 
data suggests that the robust military approach is mission specific and is in response 
to the security situation on the ground.  This research study concluded that there had 
been no shift in approach from a pacifist to a robust military approach.  The 
deployment of the FIB in the eastern DRC was designed specifically to address the 
threat level posed by the M23 and it was incumbent on the peacekeepers to respond 
adequately.  Likewise, the intervention in Mali by the French army and MINUSMA 
was aimed at sending a peacekeeping force that would be able to address the threat 
posed by the Tuareg separatists and Islamic fundamentalists.  The UN Charter and 
the principles of peace missions have always made provision for the UN 
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peacekeeping force and, by extension, the regional peacekeeping forces to respond 
adequately to the threat level in the theatre of tactical operations. 
4.8. CONCLUSION 
The purpose of this chapter was to determine whether there had been a change in 
approach from a pacifist to robust military approach.  The main research question 
was informed by the events between 2012 and 2014 when the UNSC had authorised 
robust military intervention in at least four cases.  The cases selected for the 
purposes of this study included the deployment of the FIB in the eastern DRC and 
the French army intervention in Mali – joined later by MINISMA. 
The findings of the research study were that, although the period between 2012 and 
2015 had seen the UN authorise at least four robust military interventions, this did 
not, in fact, indicate a shift from a pacifist to a robust military approach as the 
preferred peace mission strategy.  The researcher argued that UN Charter and 
Principles of Peace Missions have always made provision for a robust approach if 
conditions warrant the need to do so.  Both the FIB and the French army in the DRC 
and Mali were responding to the threat level posed by the armed groups with which 
they were confronted. 
South Africa, the focus of this paper, is bound by the multilateral decisions of both 
the AU and the UN.  Thus, it does not have the authority to unilaterally favour the 
robust approach if the international community is not in support of such an approach.  
Moreover, South Africa’s official policy documents and statements by senior public 
officials always emphasise the need to achieve peace through dialogue.  Both M23 
and Mali during 2012 represented a unique situation that required a unique response.  
Accordingly, this study concludes that there is no evidence to suggest that there has 
been a shift in conflict resolution policy from a pacifist to a robust military approach. 
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Chapter 5: South Africa’s Motivation for Participating in Peace 
Missions 
5.1. INTRODUCTION 
South Africa achieved inclusive democracy in 1994 after many years of colonialism 
and apartheid.  This democracy was achieved through a negotiated settlement after 
the liberation movements and the apartheid regime had agreed that an all-out military 
confrontation was not desirable and would, in fact, be detrimental for all parties and 
for the country.  The outcome of the negotiated settlement and the subsequent 
democratic election that saw a Government of National Unity (GNU) come into 
office took many observers by surprise and has thus been labelled the ‘South African 
miracle’(McGurk, 2013).  As a result, both the domestic and the international 
community expressed the expectation that post-apartheid South Africa would 
transfer its conflict resolutions strategies to other parts of the world, particularly on 
the African continent (Department of Foreign Affairs, 1999) 
South Africa has, indeed, lived up to the expectations that it would play a role in 
conflict resolution in Africa.  The domestic and international expectations coupled 
with the country’s colonial and apartheid legacy later become key references that 
formed the basis of South Africa’s future foreign policy.  The post-apartheid, 
democratic government made it clear that its goal was to transform the country from 
a ‘pariah’ into an accepted global citizen (Schraeder, 2001).  It was, therefore, not 
surprising when Mandela announced that post-apartheid South Africa’s foreign 
policy would be anchored on the promotion of human rights, democracy, conflict 
resolution and global cooperation on multilateral platforms (Mandela, 1993; Qobo & 
Nyathi, 2016). 
South Africa’s painful history of colonialism and apartheid was key in shaping South 
Africa’s foreign policy identity and engagements.  South African liberation 
movements had received support from both neighbouring countries and abroad and 
thus the apartheid regime had ensured that the neighbouring countries which 
supported the liberation movements also felt the brunt of the regime through random 
military raids and by suffocating them economically.  Realising the extent of the 
assistance received by the liberation movements at significant risk to those who had 
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supported these movements, the post-apartheid government declared that Africa 
would be at the centre of South Africa’s foreign policy engagements (DIRCO, 2011).  
Mandela (1993, p. 87) argued that “South Africa cannot escape its African destiny”, 
thus indicating that the country would not progress if the Africa, continent and, in 
particular, Southern Africa, were excluded from any plans for its economic and 
social progress.  These sentiments are also captured in the draft white paper on 
foreign policy with DIRCO acknowledging that South Africa cannot be an “island of 
prosperity in the ocean of poverty” (DIRCO, 2011, p. 20).  Recognising the shared 
humanity and the compassion shown to its own liberation struggle against apartheid 
by other African countries, South Africa’s foreign policy identity is, therefore, 
grounded in the philosophy of ‘ubuntu’ (Qobo & Nyathi, 2016). 
The philosophy of ubuntu has become a guideline in South Africa’s foreign policy 
engagement, particularly in Africa.  Ubuntu is described as a “worldview that 
attempts to capture the essence of what it means to be human, accentuating 
connectedness and a sense of responsibility towards others” (Qobo & Nyathi, 2016, 
p. 423).  In line with this philosophy, South Africa has placed the ‘African Agenda’ 
at the centre of its foreign policy engagements.  South Africa’s African Agenda is 
intrinsically linked with the ideals of the African renaissance which is aimed at 
championing Africa’s renewal and placing the African continent on a trajectory of 
development, peace and stability (DIRCO, 2011). 
At the centre of Africa’s renaissance is the vision to craft new strategies for 
achieving economic growth, development and improved forms of governance on the 
continent  (Vale & Maseko, 1998).  South Africa has, therefore, placed itself at the 
centre of Africa’s developmental agenda by playing a key role in the design of 
institution such as the AU, NEPAD, APRM and other relevant institutions on the 
continent (McGurk, 2013).  One of the preconditions for achieving the vision of the 
African Agenda is peace and stability on the continent and South Africa has made it 
its duty to play a significant role in the realisation of this precondition. 
It is against this backdrop that, since 1994, South Africa has played a significant role 
in conflict resolution in Africa.  South Africa has participated, and continues to 
participate, in various conflict resolution mechanisms on the continent ranging from 
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preventative diplomacy, peace-making and peacekeeping to peacebuilding and 
humanitarian interventions (Department of Foreign Affairs, 1999). 
When one studies South Africa’s official policy documents in relation to its 
engagement with the international community, one may prematurely conclude that 
South Africa’s participation in peace missions is based on the idealist understanding 
of international relations.  It is thus easy to conclude South Africa is not driven by 
the benefits it may accrue from its participation in peace missions and that its 
participation is based on altruistic reasons just as other countries assisted it without 
expecting anything in return when it was fighting its own liberation struggle. 
South Africa has participated in peace missions since 1998.  At any given time 
between 2003 and the recent withdrawal of the South African contingent deployed in 
Sudan (Darfur) during April 2015, it has contributed an average of 3 000 uniformed 
personnel to peace missions annually (Liebenberg & Mokoena, 2014).  At the time 
of writing this research report, South Africa was still deployed in the FIB and was 
considering sending troops to South Sudan (Leijenaar, 2016).  
The noble reasons for pursuing the African Agenda are understandable.  However, 
are these only reasons why South Africa would risk its citizens in peace missions?  
One of the many roles of academia is to critically analyse policy pronouncements 
and intent vis-à-vis policy action, implementation and outcome.  This research paper 
was, therefore, aimed a critically analysing South Africa’s participation in peace 
missions.  From an IR theory perspective, what is the motivation behind South 
Africa’s participation in peace missions on the African continent? 
5.2. MOTIVATION FOR SOUTH AFRICA’S PARTICIPATION IN 
PEACE MISSIONS 
The research study was limited to interpreting South Africa’s participation in peace 
missions on the basis of the realist and idealist theories of IR only.  As with all IR 
theories, both idealism and realism are founded on certain basic assumptions. These 
have already been explained in detail in the literature review and the discussion of 
the theoretical framework in chapter two of the research report.  Accordingly, this 
section discusses the main themes or reasons that emerged from the data gathering 
(literature research and interviews) as to the motivation behind South Africa’s 
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participation in peace missions.  At the end of the research report the researcher will 
indicate the conclusions reached as to which of the two IR theories is more dominant 
when one analyses South Africa’s participation in peace missions. 
5.2.1. South Africa’s National Interests 
Defining National Interests 
Various scholars and policy analysts have contrasting views on the motivation for 
South Africa’s participation in peace missions in Africa.  The reason cited most often 
for South Africa’s participation in peace missions is that South Africa is merely 
pursuing its national interests.  However, at the same time, there seem to be 
contradictions in respect of the understanding of the concept of national interest 
because, in the main, the concept is interpreted from the perspective of a realist 
understanding of IR.  Thus, in view of these contradictions in the understanding of 
the concept of national interest, the researcher deemed it necessary to clarify his 
understanding of what national interest is.  It was envisaged that this clarification 
would add conceptual value when a stand was taken on whether the national interest 
motivation argument is credible in determining whether if South Africa’s 
participation in peace missions is influenced by wither the realist or the idealist 
interpretation of IR. 
In its most simple form, national interests are the “most vital needs of the country” 
and thus the state will do whatever it takes to secure these vital needs (Landsberg, 
2010, p. 273).  It is vital that these needs are met if the state to prosper and secure its 
survival in an anarchic global system.  In the context of classical IR national interests 
are usually associated with realism with the advocates of realism viewing national 
interest as the maximisation of power and self-perseverance in the conduct of 
international relations (Morgenthau, 1978; Russell, 1994).  National interest would, 
therefore, play a role in the state determining of the policy goals to be pursued and 
also clarify the extent to which the state willing to go to realise such goals.  From the 
realist perspective, national interests may include extending state influence through 
military power and flexing economic muscle to achieve its own aims in the conduct 
of international relations.  At the end, national interests are those things which the 
state decides are important and which the state is willing to pursue at all costs. They 
are usually clearly defined in the form of policy documents (Landsberg, 2010). 
Precious Pakamile Hlungwani 775032 
 
78 
Contrary to the realist interpretation of national interest, contemporary scholars of IR 
have started to interpret national interest from the idealist perspective.  DIRCO 
agrees that national interest includes most of the characteristics as pointed out by 
realist but adds that national interest may also include “common agenda and shared 
values for a better world” and thus may be mutually beneficial for all parties 
concerned (Landsberg, 2010, p. 277).  Qobo and Nyathi (2016) have also argued that 
the philosophy of Ubuntu, which is new the field of IR, is gaining momentum in the 
conduct of foreign relations.  It is therefore, important that, when one evaluates 
South Africa’s participation in peace mission, that one understand that national 
interest may also be interpreted within the context of both idealism and realism. 
Idealists do concur with their rival advocates of realism counterparts that states 
always act in their national interests.  However, for idealists, this does not have to be 
always about the maximisation of the state power and the survival of the regime.  
National interests emanate from the culture and values of domestic society. As 
pointed in the draft white paper on foreign policy, South Africa does not believe that 
the international system is characterised only by anarchy and that states have to 
pursue the narrow interest under cover of securing their sovereignty (DIRCO, 2011).  
As the minster of DIRCO, Maite Nkoane-Mashabane, states that, in its pursuit of 
national interests, South Africa will recognise that “states can work together around 
common global agenda and shared values for a better world” (Landsberg, 2010, p. 
278). 
Thus, from DIRCO’s perspective, South Africa understands both the realist and the 
idealist pursuit of national interests.  Thus, although South Africa would prefer its 
conduct of foreign policy to be dominated by the idealist understanding of national 
interest, the realities of the global order compel it to prioritise its national interests 
from the realist perspective when necessary.  It is due to the dominance of realist 
foreign policy pragmatism that South Africa’s participation in peace missions is 
limited primarily to the countries in which strategic interest is the key driver of 
foreign policy (Department of Foreign Affairs, 1999). 
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National Interests as a Motive for South Africa’s Participation in Peace 
Missions 
Bothy the document analysis and the interviews conducted for the purposes of this 
study revealed that South Africa has not explained in detail exactly what its national 
interests are.  Landsberg has criticised South Africa lack of clearly defined national 
interests because this makes the analysis of its foreign policy and foreign policy 
activities difficult in scholarly enquiry (Landsberg, 2010; Landsberg & Georghiou, 
2015).  The draft white paper on foreign policy attempts to clarify South Africa’s 
national interests but lacks detail and provides definitions in broad terms only while 
there is no clear explanation of how these national interests will be pursued.  
Accordingly, this research report had to rely on various policy documents and 
statements although it did also rely mainly on the draft white paper on foreign policy 
to deduce what South Africa’s national interests are. 
Mindful of South Africa’s apartheid past, those responsible for making and 
implementing South Africa’s foreign policy of foreign policy have argued that the 
country’s past will determine its future identity and its national interests (Moore, 
2014).  The many policy documents in place and the speeches of prominent 
government officials acknowledge that the country is thankful for the selfless 
sacrifices and solidarity it was shown during the apartheid era and thus their wish for 
South Africans is what the wish for other citizens of the world.  South Africa’s 
national interest may, therefore, be articulated as “people-centred, including 
promoting the well-being, development and upliftment of its people … and ensuring 
prosperity of the country, its region and the continent” (DIRCO, 2011, p. 10).  
Those who subscribe to the realist school of thought would argue that, despite South 
Africa’s noble articulation that its engagement with Africa is based on noble and 
altruistic intentions, its participation in the peace missions is driven by a realist 
understanding of national interests.  Realists would point out that South Africa is an 
ambitious, middle power country and, therefore, it is driven by the desire to improve 
its global stature in the majority of its foreign policy conduct and activity.  In fact, it 
is due to South Africa’s desire to be perceived as a credible leader on the continent 
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and the global south that South Africa has prioritised its participation in peace 
missions and conflict resolutions at large (Heleta, 2016; Mathoho, 2016). 
In addition, realists would be quick to point out South Africa’s ambition to be 
Africa’s permanent representative at the UNSC and its economic interest in countries 
in which it undertook major deployments, such as Burundi, Sudan and the DRC, are 
evidence that its participation in peace missions is driven by realism (Heinecken & 
Ferreira, 2012).  Thus, South Africa’s national interest, as understood from the realist 
perspective, could be the reason why it prioritises countries where it has strategic 
interests and shows less enthusiasm in areas in which it has no major, direct interests 
(Landsberg, 2010). 
According to the white paper on South Africa’s participation for peace missions 
(1999), the level and extent of South Africa’s contribution to a peace mission are 
determined by “how closely the mission relates to national interests” and thus in 
instances in which core national interests are at stake, its contribution may even 
exceed its normal contribution (Department of Foreign Affairs, 1999, p. 25).  This 
may, in turn, explain why South Africa’s contribution in the DRC, Burundi and 
Sudan was so high while it sent only military observers and technical expects to 
countries such as the Ivory Coast and Ethiopia/Eretria (Conwell, 2016). 
Although this view may be correct, the focus of the view is both one sided and solely 
on the realist interpretation of what national interest is in relation to foreign relations.  
On the other hand, idealists would argue that South Africa’s participation in peace 
missions represents an integral part of South Africa’s identity as inspired by the 
philosophy of ubuntu.  In this regard, it is true that South Africa’s participation is 
motivated by the desire to pursue its national interests.  However, the national 
interests to which idealists are referring are inspired by the desire to assist those who 
are the victims of political repression and the scourge of violent conflicts 
(Department of Foreign Affairs, 1999).  Idealists would argue that South Africa is 
both an economic and a military power and, therefore, its national values and 
identity compels it to assist in conflict affect areas.  Accordingly, South Africa’s 
participation in peace missions is for the sake of human good and is based on 
humanitarian grounds (Roos, 2016a). 
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It is important from an academic point of view to accept that it is almost impossible 
to accurately determine what the motives of political actors are, especially when they 
claim to be acting in the ‘national interests’, be it from a realist or idealist 
perspective.  According to Hans Morgenthau (1978), to search for motive of foreign 
policy on why actors take certain foreign decisions is a futile and a deceptive 
exercise.  It is futile because motives are the most elusive factor in psychological 
data and frequently beyond recognition, from the point of view of the interests and 
emotions of the foreign policy actors and also those studying foreign policy actions. 
Consequently, researchers already have motives of their own when they embark on 
scholarly enquiry.  Sometimes they are not even aware of their own bias.  
Consequently, it often becomes almost impossible to gauge the motives of others if 
the individual is not even sure of his/her own motives and bias.  Morgenthau (1978) 
maintains that history shows that there is no exact correlation between the quality of 
the motives behind foreign policy and the quality of the foreign policy actions.  This 
is true in both moral and political terms.  In short, it was not easy to ascertain 
whether South Africa’s participation in peace missions is driven by national interests 
as understood by either idealist or realists because both arguments are credible and 
there is empirical evidence to support either of the two opposing arguments. 
5.2.2. South Africa’s Regional and International Obligation 
Post-apartheid South Africa assured the international community of its desire to 
break away from the stigma of the ‘pariah’ state under the apartheid regime and 
become a law-abiding member of the global community (Alden & Le Pere, 2004).  
Consequently, South Africa has made commitments to participate in multilateral 
platforms where the country is duty bound to do so in terms of both its international 
and regional commitments (Nathan, 2005). 
As a signatory to the UN Charter, South Africa recognises that the UN is the primary 
international body which is responsible for peacekeeping missions.  As such, South 
Africa has committed itself to contribute in peace missions under the principle of 
volunteerism when requested to do so (Leijenaar, 2016).  South Africa has, in fact, 
been requested several times to participate in both AU and UN peacekeeping.  In 
addition, it has also participated in various regional and sub-regional peace missions 
under Chapter VIII of the UN Charter (Department of Foreign Affairs, 1999).  South 
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Africa’s participation in peace mission is a clear demonstration of its commitment to 
contribute to international peace and stability through multilateral platforms 
(Leijenaar, 2016) . 
Highlighting this point, Mandela was requested to take over the negotiations and 
mediation efforts that culminated in the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement 
that was signed on 28 August 2000 (Heinecken & Ferreira, 2012).  Part of the 
agreement involved setting up a transactional government.  However, some rebel 
groups protested against this.  In order to demonstrate its commitment to the Arusha 
Accord, South Africa set up a South African Protection Support Detachment 
(SAPSD) which was later integrated into the AU peace mission (Heinecken & 
Ferreira, 2012).  This was a high-risk mission, because under normal circumstances, 
UN peacekeeping requires that a cease fire must be agreed upon first and this was 
not the case in Burundi (de Carvallo, 2016). 
Similar to this was South Africa’s participation in MONUSCO.  Through SADC, 
South Africa played a central role in the process that culminated in the Lusaka 
Ceasefire Agreement in 2001 and the subsequent deployment of MONUSCO.  Thus, 
both the Burundian and the DRC peace missions demonstrate that South Africa is 
serious about living up to its status of a middle power economy as the realists would 
proclaim.  Its participation in these high risk missions so early after attaining its 
democracy demonstrated that it would be possible for South Africa to achieve its 
ambition of becoming a permanent representative of Africa at the UNSC and other 
multilateral forums (Mathoho, 2016).  Realists would argue that participating in 
peace missions gives some credibility to South Africa’s claim that it is a leader on 
the African continent and a representative of Africa on multilateral platforms 
(Saunders, 2014). 
In addition, the country demonstrated its willingness to lend assistance to other 
countries facing political turmoil and instability.  After all, its philosophy of ubuntu 
involves it being there for those who suffering from the scourge of violent conflict 
(Qobo & Nyathi, 2016).  South Africa’s voluntary commitments to both international 
and regional organisations was, in part, due to its commitment to participate in the 
resolution of international disputes (Mathoho, 2016) while it is also fully committed 
to meet its regional obligations, especially in Southern Africa.  “Not only has South 
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Africa committed its meagre resources to these peace missions, but it also risks the 
lives of its citizens in order for others to enjoy the same peace we enjoy” (Roos, 
2016a).  This is a point which idealists highlight when referring to South Africa’s 
participation in peace missions. 
5.2.3. African Renaissance and African Agenda 
One of the key pillars of South Africa’s foreign policy and which is linked to its 
regional commitments is the country’s commitment to Africa or, to phrase it 
differently, the ‘African Agenda’.  The African Agenda has been present in South 
Africa’s three democratic administrations from Mandela, to Mbeki and now Zuma.  
However, it was during Mbeki’s presidency that Africa took centre stage as a priority 
of the government (McGurk, 2013).  In addition, Zuma’s administration has been 
credited with the draft policy document (draft white paper on foreign policy) that 
attempted to clarify what is intended by the African Agenda as a key pillar of 
government foreign policy (DIRCO, 2011).  The African Agenda is premised on the 
promotion of peace, security and development in Africa (Graham, 2014).  
The African Agenda is aimed at achieving the ideals of the Africa’s Renaissance.  
The main objective of the African Renaissance was intended to address the issues of 
underdevelopment and the marginalisation of the continent on the global stage.  
Mbeki argued that peace and stability on the continent was a precondition for 
realising the Africa’s Renaissance (Vale & Maseko, 1998).  It would be impossible 
for the continent to address issues of underdevelopment, grow its economy and be 
taken seriously by the international community while torn by conflicts.  Thus, for 
development to take place, it is essential that there is peace and stability in the region 
(Verhoeven, Murthy, & Soares de Oliveira, 2014). 
Linked to the ideals of the African Agenda and the African Renaissance is the 
concept of  “African solutions to African Problems”, especially in terms of conflict 
resolution on the continent (Verhoeven et al., 2014, p. 517).  The Rwandan genocide 
in 1994, M23’s occupation of Goma in 2012, UNSC Resolution 1978 and the 
consequent death of Gaddafi in Libya are some of the examples why Africa cannot 
afford to continue to rely on external partners to resolve its conflicts (Roos, 2016a).  
External actors have demonstrated that, in  the main, they intervene only in cases 
when their political and economic interests are being threatened, such as the French 
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intervention in Mali and CAR; and NATO involvement in Libya (Roos, 2016a).  
South Africa has been a staunch advocate of the ‘African solutions to African 
problems’, particularly in instances in which conflicts must be resolved  (Nathan & 
others, 2013; Verhoeven et al., 2014).  To emphasise this point, Van Nieuwkerk 
(2012) and Moore (2015) argued that South Africa’s participation in peace missions 
in Africa could be interpreted as a means of pursuing its foreign policy objective of 
the ‘African Agenda. 
Again, the African Agenda as a key pillar of South Africa’s foreign policy may be 
interpreted from both the realist and the idealist perspective.  Realists would argue 
that, for South Africa to be able to expand its trade on the continent, it needs to 
ensure political and economic stability on the continent in the interests of a safe 
business environment (De Carvallo, 2016).  It is worth noting at this point that, 
South Africa’s businesses dominate in the majority of the regions where it has 
participated in peace missions. 
On the other hand, idealist would argue that the African Renaissance Agenda is 
noble and does not only benefit South Africa.  However, they would also agree that 
South African business interests have benefited in the places where it helped to build 
relative peace, such as in Burundi and Sudan (De Carvallo, 2016).  Nevertheless, 
they will also be quick to point out that this was a mutually beneficial relationship as 
the conflict-affected areas managed to restore the peace and stability and that, in the 
long term, South Africa’s involvement promoted the development of those countries 
(Leijenaar, 2016).  After South Africa had deployed troops to Burundi between 2001 
and 2006, Burundi’s GDP grew from 800 million US Dollars to 1.3 billion US 
dollars and, by 2016, its GDP stood at 3.1 billion US dollars (World Bank, 2017).  
Idealists would, therefore, highlight the economic growth in Burundi as an example 
of a mutually beneficial relationship as both countries benefited from South Africa’s 
participation in the peace mission (Leijenaar, 2016). 
5.2.4. African Solidarity and Regional Stability 
The OAU played a significant role in ending apartheid in South Africa by offering 
refuge to members of the liberation movements as well as other related support 
required in the liberation struggle.  As a result, the post-apartheid government made 
a commitment to demonstrate the same kind of solidarity and support which it was 
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shown during the liberation struggle (DIRCO, 2011).  As a country with an 
oppressed past, South Africa has committed itself to show solidarity and support to 
those countries in difficult conditions, be it famine, drought or the scourge of conflict 
(Mathoho, 2016). 
The government had already indicated in 1996, before it deployed troops on its first 
peace mission, that it would show solidarity and support to those affected by 
conflict.  As Mbeki (1996) proclaimed in his most renowned ‘I am an African’ 
speech, “the pain of the violent conflict that the peoples of Liberia, Somalia, the 
Sudan, Burundi and Algeria is a pain I also bear”.  As a result, wherever there is 
great suffering on the part of people in Africa, South Africa has been willing to show 
its support.  According to De Carvallo (2016), “South Africa’s participation in peace 
missions is one way of showing support to those who are going through difficult 
times, just as other African countries helped the liberation movements during 
apartheid”. 
In addition to African solidarity, it is in South Africa’s interest to establish, maintain 
and promote peace and stability in Africa, particularly in southern Africa.  As early 
as the 1990s, before the ANC came to power, Mandela had argued that, for South 
Africa to reach its full potential in terms of its development and economic goals, the 
region had to be stable.  As he explained, “If we do not devote our energies to this 
continent, we, too, could fall victim to the forces that has brought ruin to its various 
parts” (Mandela, 1993, p. 87).  Mandela was, therefore, clearly aware that South 
Africa’s future growth path was dependent on a peaceful and stable environment and 
thus it was incumbent on South Africa to demonstrate solidarity with those going 
through difficult times. 
DIRCO frequently emphasises that it is not possible for South Africa to achieve its 
developmental and economic goals if the African continent is not stable (Leijenaar, 
2016).  Thus, the prerequisite to achieving the envisaged continental unity that will 
propel Africa to sustainable development and economic heights is that there must 
first be peace and stability on the continent (Roos, 2016).  After all, it would be 
impossible for South Africa to achieve meaningful economic growth while 
surrounded by poverty stricken and conflict-ridden neighbours (de Carvallo, 2016).  
In other words, South Africa must participate in peace missions to ensure the 
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regional stability which is a precondition for its own sustainable development and 
that of Africa.  
When realists analyse African solidarity as a reason to participate in peace mission, 
they would agree that, yes indeed, South Africa must assist in conflict torn areas and 
show solidarity with the people who are suffering from the scourge of violent 
conflicts.  However, realists would also argue that, by demonstrating the so-called 
‘African solidarity’, South Africa is a major benefactor as it raises its profile in the 
global arena and also benefits economically.  Its participation in peace missions also 
gives South Africa leverage to negotiate economic deals in its favour, for example, 
South Africa’s mining interests in the DRC (de Carvallo, 2016). 
Realists would further argue that South Africa’s priority to ensure regional stability 
is motivated by the realisation that unstable neighbours pose a security threat and, 
hence, it must participate in conflict resolution and peace missions.  They would 
argue that South Africa is an economic powerhouse in the region and, therefore, it 
becomes the first choice of destination in Africa for those seeking to flee conflict in 
their countries (Mathoho, 2016).  South Africa is already facing its own challenges 
of unemployment and poverty and thus large numbers of refugees only exacerbate 
the problem (Roos, 2016a).  Moreover, because economic trade generally declines 
during conflict this affects South African businesses operating in those countries and 
thus compromises revenue collection by the South African government.  In short, for 
realists, African solidarity and regional stability as motivations for South Africa’s 
participation in peace missions is biased in favour of South Africa as South Africa 
benefits the most of these peace missions. 
Idealists, on the other hand, will interpret South Africa prioritisation of regional 
stability and African solidarity differently from their realist counterparts arguing that 
regional stability will bring peace and security to all parties and this, in turn, will 
improve economic development in the region.  Moreover, in essence, the philosophy 
of ubuntu is that ‘you wash my hands today, and I will wash your hands tomorrow’ 
(Qobo & Nyathi, 2016).  South Africa was shown solidarity and received significant 
support from other African countries during the apartheid era and, therefore, it has a 
moral obligation to assist conflict ridden countries.  In addition, most importantly for 
idealist is that South Africa has the means and capacity to help due to its military and 
Precious Pakamile Hlungwani 775032 
 
87 
economic power in the region and thus it does so because it has the means to help 
(Conwell, 2016). 
5.3. CONCLUSION 
South Africa has an extremely difficult past characterised by both colonialism and 
apartheid.  It was the last country on the continent to be liberated from white 
minority rule.  During the apartheid era, both the OAU and global society 
contributed to the end of apartheid and the democracy that succeeded it.  This 
difficult history has played a significant role in shaping South Africa’s foreign 
policy.  In respect to Africa, South Africa has made the continent its priority and 
wants to contribute to the renaissance of the continent.  As a result, one of the 
foreign policy objectives is to contribute to conflict resolution on the continent. 
Since the inception of democracy, South Africa has participated in no less than 15 
peace missions on the continent (Heinecken & Ferreira, 2012).  South Africa is 
mainly credited for bringing about peace in Burundi and for its participation in the 
FIB in the eastern DRC.  These peace missions have been costly in terms of both 
lives and funding for South Africa.  Nevertheless, despite the massive challenges of 
unemployment, inequality and poverty it faces, South Africa continues to commit 
resources to peace missions, including funding continental joint military exercises 
such as AMANI AFRICA I and II (Institute for Security Studies, 2015). 
From an IR theory point of view, this study aimed to determine whether South 
Africa’s participation in peace mission is driven by either an idealist’s or a realist’s 
understanding of IR.  Those who subscribe to the realist school of thought would 
argue that, among other reasons, South Africa’s participation in peace missions is 
motivated by its desire to improve its international stature, economic opportunities 
and global influence (Van Nieuwkerk, 2012).  On the other hand, idealists would 
argue that South African participation in peace mission is rooted in its philosophy of 
‘ubuntu’ and altruism (DIRCO, 2011).  For the idealist, South Africa has a moral 
obligation to participate in peace missions due to its economic and military power 
and thus it cannot afford to distance itself when its neighbours are plunged into 
political instability and insecurity (Nathan, 2011). 
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Both the realist and idealist arguments are credible.  It was not possible for this study 
to come to any definite conclusions as to which of the two schools of though is 
dominant in South Africa’s participation in peace missions.  However, it suffices to 
say that there is empirical evidence supporting either of the arguments.  Accordingly, 
the study concluded that South Africa’s participation in peace missions may be 
narrowed down to the four themes discussed above and that all of them may be 
explained from either the realist or the idealist perspective of IR. 
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Chapter 6. Conclusions and Future Research 
6.1. INTRODUCTION 
The preceding chapters discussed two related topics in relation to South Africa’s 
participation in peace mission in Africa.  In view of the fact that peace mission 
concept is so broad and includes distinct stages and actors in the broader spectrum of 
conflict resolution mechanisms, this research study focused only on the peace 
missions where the military element is the main actor. 
As a result, the research questions were twofold.  Firstly, the research report was 
aimed at determining whether there has been a shift in policy approach from a 
pacifist to a robust military approach to peace missions.  Secondly, the study wanted 
to determine the motivations behind South Africa’s participation in peace missions.  
Accordingly, this chapter reflects briefly on the research findings in respect of the 
two research questions posed in the study.  In addition, the chapter also suggest areas 
which were identified for future research. 
6.2. CONCLUSIONS AND MAIN FINDINGS 
6.2.1. The Shift from a Pacifist to a Robust Military Approach to Peace 
Missions. 
In order to determine whether South Africa and/or the peacekeeping fraternity at 
large (UN and AU) has shifted its approach to peace missions from a pacifist to a 
robust military intervention the paper analysed two case studies, namely, the 
deployment and success of the robust military intervention by the FIB in the eastern 
DRC in 2013 and Mali’s appeal to the French Army to intervene in the Malian 
conflict in 2013.  The two case studies were analysed in context of the establishment 
of the ACIRC Brigade as an interim measure that is intended to provide the AU with 
a rapid deployment capability so as to enable it to intervene in violent conflicts on 
the continent. 
In view of the very nature of case studies, it was possible to generalise the findings 
from the case studies to determine an approach or peacekeeping policy trends.  
Accordingly, the research findings of the two case studies were generalised to 
determine whether the ACIRC Brigade could be seen an indicator of a policy shift in 
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approach to peace missions from a pacifist to a robust military approach.  It was 
anticipated that the two case studies of the FIB and the intervention of the French 
army in Mali would shed some light if, indeed, there has been a shift in policy 
approach.  In addition, since the UN had authorised at least four missions involving a 
‘robust military’ approach in the four years prior to the study, the research report 
also attempted to assess the future of a robust military approach to peace missions. 
In January 2013, the AU Commission highlighted to the AU Summit the urgent need 
to establish an interim measure that would fill the security gap that had resulted from 
the delay in commissioning the ASF.  The ACIRC concept was proposed and was 
adopted by the AU Summit in January 2014.  The proposal to establish the ACIRC 
was based on two separate, but related, events that had embarrassed the AU and 
exposed its lack of capacity to resolve violent conflicts in Africa.  The AU adopted 
the ACIRC mechanism as an offensive force that would give the AU a rapid 
deployment capability to intervene in conflict ridden areas.  The difference between 
the ACIRC mechanism and a normal peacekeeping force was that it would be 
authorised to actively pursue spoilers of peace and engage them in combat in order to 
bring an end to harmed hostilities.  The question arose as to whether the proposal to 
establish ACIRC could then indicate a departure from the customary pacifist 
approach to peacekeeping to a more robust approach? 
In 2013 the UNSC passed two resolutions authorising a robust military approach to 
peace missions to restore peace and stability in the eastern DRC and in Mali.  
Resolution 2098, which authorised the FIB, was the first instance that the UN had 
authorised a peacekeeping force to actively pursue and disarm armed groups, thus 
signalling a change in peace missions as generally known (Cammaert, 2013).  Soon 
after the deployment of the FIB, the French army intervened in Mali in January 2013 
at the request of the interim government of Mali (Wing, 2016).  The UN also 
deployed the MINUSMA in July 2013 with the same mandate as that of the FIB. 
As a response to the occupation of Goma and the French intervention in Mali during 
2012 and 2013 respectively, the AU proposed an establishment of ACIRC as an 
interim measure to intervene in conflict areas until the commissioning of the ASF.  
The rationale behind the establishment of ACIRC was to fill the security gap left by 
the ASF in the APSA mechanism for conflict resolution.  However, it is important to 
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note the approach adopted by the ACIRC mechanism is that of an offensive force 
such as the FIB and MINUSMA.  Did these two case, FIB and French army 
intervention in the DRC and Mali respectively, signal a change from a pacifist 
approach to peace mission to a robust military approach? 
The data gathered from the literature review and the interviews conducted for the 
purposes of the study suggests that, empirically, there was evidence of a shift from a 
pacifist to a more robust approach to resolving violent conflicts.  Since its 
authorisation for the deployment of the FIB in the eastern DRC and MINUSA in 
Mali, the UNSC has deployed similar missions to the CAR and South Sudan.  Thus, 
in respect of empirical evidence from 2013 until 2016, it would appear that there has 
been a departure from a pacifist approach to robust military intervention to resolving 
violent conflict in Africa. 
Contrary to the quantitative evidence, both the AU and the UN are quick to point out 
that the preferred approach to resolving conflict is through peaceful means that avoid 
violence (Mathoho, 2016).  The robust military approach to actively engage and 
pursue armed groups in the DRC and Mali was merely a response to the military 
threats at the tactical level in order to counter the risk posed by the armed groups 
(Mathoho, 2016).  The ACIRC concept, as with the FIB, would not be the first 
option regarding intervention in conflict areas and other peaceful means would first 
have to exhausted before the AU deployed the ACIRC brigade to a theatre of conflict 
(African Union, 2016).  In other words, ACIRC would be deployed as a last resort in 
specific circumstances on which this paper has already elaborated. 
As explained in Article 4(h) of the AU Constitutive Act and all the scenarios relating 
to the deployment of the ACIRC Brigade (Esmenjaud, 2014; Warner, 2015), at the 
time of the study it appeared that there was a future for a robust peacekeeping force 
such as the ACIRC to be available to the AU in its response to violent conflicts.  The 
continued instability in Burundi, DRC, Mali, South Sudan, Somalia, CAR and other 
conflict-torn countries is an indication that it is essential that the AU has the ACIRC 
Brigade at its disposal so that it may be deployed whenever it is required and as 
outlined in the guidelines for the deployment of ACIRC.  When a military threat at 
the tactical level requires a response such as the FIB and in situations similar to the 
invention by the French army in Mali during 2013, the AU must be ready (Mathoho, 
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2016).  Accordingly, the AU must be able to call on the ACIRC Brigade in the 
interim while capacitating the ASF. 
In short, the research study concluded that the FIB deployment in the eastern DRC, 
the French army intervention in Mali and the establishment of ACIRC do not 
indicate a change from a pacifist to a robust military approach to peace missions.  All 
these had happened in response to the prevailing military situation at the tactical 
level.  It is thus important that the AU and the UN are always ready to respond with 
the appropriate force as outlined in the UN Charter. 
6.2.2. The Motivation for South Africa’s Participation in Peace Missions 
South Africa has been participating in conflict resolutions since the democratic 
government came to power in 1994.  Since 1998 South Africa participated in no less 
than 15 SADC, AU and UN peace missions with an average of 3 000 troops 
deployed in various regions on the continent at a time (Liebenberg & Mokoena, 
2014).  South Africa is, therefore, clearly one of the key role players in African 
peace missions and has shown its commitment to peace keeping by deploying troops 
on high-risk missions such as in Burundi, the DRC and Sudan.  It was one of the first 
countries to volunteer to participate in the FIB.  At the time of writing this research 
report there were talks that South Africa was also contemplating deploying another 
peace mission to South Sudan (Conwell, 2016). 
The second research question aimed at establishing the motivation behind South 
Africa’s participation in peace mission.  The data analysis conducted in the study 
was based on the two classical theories of IR, namely, realism and idealism.  Thus, 
stated differently, is South Africa’s participation in peace missions motivated by 
idealism or idealism in its foreign policy conduct? 
The question proved to be more difficult to answer than may appear from the 
research.  The data from the literature reviews and the interviews revealed several 
reasons for South Africa’s participation in peace missions.  These 
reasons/motivations were narrowed down to four broad themes, namely, national 
interests, regional and international obligations, African Agenda, and African 
solidarity and regional stability.  Using the main basic assumptions of idealism and 
realism discussed in detail in Chapter two of the research study, the paper was able 
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codify which of these four broad themes reflected either the realist or the idealist 
approach in South Africa’s participation in peace missions. 
In terms of all of the four broad themes discussed, there was sufficient evidence to 
argue for either the realist or idealist understanding of IR when analysing South 
Africa’s motivation for participating in peace missions.  For example, the white 
paper on South Africa’s participation in peace missions is clear that its participation 
in peace mission is driven by national interest.  The white paper goes further to state 
that the size and level of South Africa’s contribution will be determined by “how 
closely the mission relates to national interests” (Department of Foreign Affairs, 
1999).  As much as there is no official document that details South Africa’s national 
interests, the draft white paper on South Africa’s foreign policy and public 
statements from senior government officials continue to attempt to explain what is 
meant by its national interests.  These national interests include the pursuit of 
economic growth through increased trade and exploring business opportunities in 
Africa, pursuing economic development and improving governance in the regions 
though initiatives such as NEPAD and APRM and the pursuit of peace and stability 
on the continent.  All of these could be interpreted as South Africa’s national 
interests.   
National interest as a motivation for South Africa’s participation in peace missions 
(and the other three themes discussed in Chapter 5) could be explained from the 
perspective of both the idealist and the realist understanding for IR.  In this regard, 
the paper concludes that realists would argue that South Africa’s participation in 
peace missions is driven by a realist approach to its foreign policy.  For example, 
they would cite South Africa’s business interests in countries such as Burundi and 
the DRC as the reason why it was prepared to deploy troops to the FIB.  Moreover, 
realists would argue that South Africa is a middle power and a hegemon in the 
region and, therefore, it must be seen to be taking its leadership role seriously by 
participating in peace mission. 
On the other hand, idealists observing the same events as their realist counterparts 
would approach the issue of national interest from a different angle.  They would 
argue that it is in South Africa’s national interest to assist those suffering from the 
scourge of conflict due to its national identity which is driven by the philosophy of 
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ubuntu.  In addition, it is in South Africa’s interest to ensure the mutual growth and 
upliftment of the region because this is the humane thing to do.  The conditions for 
mutual growth which would propel the continent out of the quagmire of 
underdevelopment and conflict require regional hegemonies such as South Africa to 
take the lead and thus South Africa is doing the common good expected from it. 
Notwithstanding the aforementioned motivations from the realist and idealist 
arguments on South Africa’s participation in peace missions the conclusion drawn in 
this paper is that there is more tangible evidence to prove that South Africa’s 
participation in peace missions is driven by a realist understanding of IR rather than 
an idealist understanding.  The basis for this viewpoint is that South Africa is too 
quick to ensure that there is stability in countries such as Lesotho and the DRC.  Any 
form of political instability and insecurity in these areas has a direct negative impact 
on South Africa.  Its participation in peace missions to the DRC, Burundi and Sudan 
indicates that South Africa reveals that it tends participate in areas where it will gain 
the necessary political mileage and economic opportunities.  If this were not the case 
how would one explain its absence in Somalia and the fact that it sent military 
observers only to the Ivory Coast and Ethiopia/Eretria during hostilities in these 
countries.  These interests in those regions were clearly not important for South 
Africa. 
The paper acknowledges that other researchers may arrive at a different conclusion 
based on the indicators they used to analyse the foreign policy motives behind South 
Africa’s participation in peace mission.  It is worth noting the statement by Hans 
Morgenthau that “to search for the clue of foreign policy exclusively in the motives 
of statesmen is both futile and deceptive.  It is futile because motives are the most 
elusive of psychological data, distorted as they are, frequently beyond recognition, 
by the interests and emotions of actor and observer alike.  Do we really know what 
our motives are? And what do we know of the motives of others?” (Morgenthau, 
1978, p. 4). 
6.3. AREAS FOR FURTHER STUDY 
During the writing of this research report, the UNSC has extended the mandate of 
the FIB in the DRC to March 2018 while the French army was still actively involved 
in the pursuit of armed groups in Mali.  Although the FIB and the French army 
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achieved military victories against the M23 and other armed groups in their 
respective theatre of operations, 4 years later the missions were still ongoing.  It is, 
therefore, clear that military victories over the spoilers of peace do not translate into 
the end of hostilities. This is in line with the findings of extensive conflict resolution 
research.  It would be interesting to ascertain why, although it is known that military 
victories do not end the disputes that lead to violent conflict, it is still difficult for the 
AU and UN to find ways in which to implement measures that would end armed 
hostilities and achieve long-term sustainable peace, for example in the DRC. 
The most violent civil wars on the African continent have taken place in Angola, 
Mozambique, Liberia and Sierra Leone.  However, since the end of these civil wars, 
there has been relative peace in these countries.  It is true that there is still a degree 
of political and security instability in these countries but, in the main, there has been 
progress towards sustainable peace.  It would be interesting to conduct a comparative 
study of the reasons why was it possible to end the violent civil war in Mozambique 
or Angola although this seems to be impossible in the DRC. 
6.4. CONCLUSIONS 
This research study established that there has not been a policy shift from a pacifist 
to a robust military approach to peace missions in Africa.  The interim establishment 
of ACIRC is not an indication of a policy shift but, rather, a response to the security 
threat posed by armed groups in conflict torn areas and an interim measure that is 
intended to fill the security gap as a result of the delay in the commissioning of the 
ASF.  In addition, the ACIRC mechanism provides the AU with a rapid deployment 
capability to intervene as soon as possible should the PSC determine that the security 
situation has deteriorated to such a level that a rapid, robust military response is 
warranted.  In addition, ACIRC will help the AU to reduce its reliance of its foreign 
and international partners in relation to military intervention in African conflicts as 
the continent pursues its agenda of self-reliance.  Thus, ACIRC must not be seen as 
replacing of a policy of peaceful settlements to disputes. 
Lastly, the research study determined that, from an IR perspective, South Africa’s 
participation in peace missions may be explained from both the realist and the 
idealist approach to foreign policy.  Notwithstanding the validity of both arguments, 
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the researcher is convinced that South Africa’s participation in peace missions is 
driven by the realist understanding of foreign policy.   
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